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ABSTRACT:   This thesis is an open-ended inquiry exploring the thought processes 
within evil actions as it relates to agent judgment and motivation.  Largely theoretical in 
nature, the goal is to better understand the inner workings of evil agency.  It is not the 
purpose of this thesis to ascertain or support a normative ethical theory of evil but rather 
investigate through metaethics, moral psychology, and ultimately Kantian ethical theory, 
how evil surfaces in action.  That being said, the question which occupies this thesis is 
“What does it mean to be evil?”  Everyone is familiar with the term “evil,” but the notion 
has many connotations in moral discourse.  Chapter one establishes a working definition 
of evil by considering the ways in which people are generally motivated to act.  Evil is 
conceptualized into two distinct categories: perverse and pure evil.  This distinction 
incites considerable debate—especially the latter conceptualization.  Whether purely evil 
motivations are possible or conceptually coherent will serve to dominate a large part of 
this chapter and the rest of this thesis.  Chapter two supplies a metaethical context to 
evaluating evil motivations in agents—motivation internalism and externalism.  These 
metaethical positions explore whether moral motivations are fundamentally inherent to 
one’s expressed judgments.  In other words, is it possible that moral judgments can fail to 
motivate someone to act?  This added dimension, though, only seems to heighten the 
controversy because pure evil involves principally choosing to do evil for itself.  
Motivation internalism seems at odds with certain motivational structures, especially the 
purely evil agent.  By highlighting the conflict between internalism and externalism, the 
subtleties of agent motivation and judgment lead to a more nuanced account of evil.  
Chapter three introduces Immanuel Kant’s account of evil in Religion within the Bounds 
of Bare Reason and how it may provide a possible solution to the troubles of motivation 
internalism.  Kant’s three grades of evil and subsequent views on diabolism are 
susceptible to an interpretation that frames pure evil as a quasi-diabolism in which the 
moral law is motivationally inverted. This solution attempts to expand Kant’s account 
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A Conceptual and Psychological Analysis of Evil  
 There is something about evil that fascinates the human mind.  From fictional novels, 
motion pictures, and popular role-playing games like Dungeons and Dragons, an extraordinary 
amount of interest has been focused on the moral intricacies of being evil.  Even so, its 
fascination in literature and pop culture is only further beset by the profundity of the concept 
philosophically.  Evil is far from the ordinary in thought and action due to its metaphysical (or 
ontological) status.  Yet, within ordinary moral discourse, it is a concept that has been utilized 
extensively in moral assessment as a sign of condemnation.
1
  It is the task of philosophers in the 
field of metaethics (with perhaps the assistance of other fields such as moral psychology) to look 
beneath moral evaluations and discover what it really means to be evil. 
 Discussions about evil tend to be dominated by normative concerns—whom or what 
actions ought to be regarded as evil according to particular moral standards.  These accounts, 
though, largely fail to penetrate the depths of an agent’s thought processes—the development of 
one’s beliefs, judgments, and motivations which leads to an “evil act”.  There is a tendency by 
laypeople to hastily ascribe specific qualities to evil, especially those with religious or theological 
overtones.
2
  Furthermore, the layperson often focuses on action itself at the cost of ignoring the 
                                                          
1
 Generally speaking in moral discourse, the term “evil” designates actions which “bad” by itself cannot 
adequately cover. Thus, the statement “X is evil” can be taken as simply a stronger and more economical 
(as well as emotionally-loaded) expression of the statement “X is really, really, really bad.” 
2
 For the purposes of staying on topic, the term “evil” will not be constrained by a fixed account. At the 
very least, some actions can be called evil while others less so or not at all. Furthermore, normative 
2 
motivations and thought process that lead to the action.  As such, the term “evil” is often invoked 
without a second thought to any deeper meaning.  Underlying the common use of the term and its 
normative meaning designated by various ethical theories is a significant conceptual and 
psychological groundwork—the “how” and “why” of evil.  These issues add to a larger 
metaethical picture.  This thesis will explore the motivational structure of evil agency and 
whether there is a different way people can think about evil.    
 This chapter will clarify the term “evil” and its significance in moral deliberation.  In 
addition, section 1.1 will outline and defend two main conceptualizations (or classifications) of 
evil in moral discourse: perverse and pure evil.  Perverse evil signifies the common, generalized, 
usage of evil and is intended to assign negative conditions to agents.  Pure evil represents a more 
technical and specified kind of evil that must be explained (and defended) further.  This 
conceptual distinction has direct implications on developing a moral psychology of evil and 
impacts the metaethical theories discussed in later chapters.   
Section 1.2 explores a position notably represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and David 
McNaughton that couches evil agency in negative terms, as embittered and maliciously rebellious 
closet lovers of the good.  Milton’s Satan, in Paradise Lost, will be used as a case study to 
ascertain the motives and psychological character of perverse and purely evil agency.  This is 
done in the hopes of persuading the reader of the view above that there are at least two different 
ways of thinking about evil.  Nonetheless, this chapter is but a precursor to a larger issue.  These 
conceptual and psychological inquiries are critically influenced by metaethical theory, in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
disputes about whether evil is dependent upon a religious meaning or can be just as intelligible in a 
secular context will be put aside.  
3 
particular the debate between motivation internalism and motivation externalism.  Sections 1.3 
and 1.4 establish this context and certain benchmarks are formulated to judge the impact both 
metaethical views have on understanding the nature of evil.  Starting with this chapter, evil will 
be examined and stripped beneath the surface to its core.
4 
1.1 The Multifarious Parameters of Evil 
 Evil has many faces and can take form in unexpected ways.  If Plato’s rendition of 
Gyges’ Ring is indicative of human tendencies towards wrongdoing, then perhaps the prospect of 
evil rests within every single person.  Erich Fromm points out that one should be careful of 
assuming that evil must look its part.  He warns that “as long as one believes that the evil man 
wears horns, one will not discover an evil man.”
3
  Any investigation into the inner workings of 
evil must heed this advice and avoid being a slave to appearances.  Even an apple that is rotten to 
the core will still remain in appearance, for some time, an ordinary apple.  The appearance or 
visible signs of evil in a person can only be interpreted to a certain extent if granted further 
information.  While others may take a more empirical route to understanding evil, the approach of 
this thesis will be decidedly conceptual and intermixed with moral psychology.  Grasping the 
nature of evil is subject to many interpretations, but examining the issue in terms of the 
parameters of judgment and motivation that precede action might produce better results.  To 
grasp evil in this way, one must look within moral discourse and see the possible manifestations 
of evil among moral agents. 
From a wholly conceptual standpoint, evil can be divided into two complementary, yet 
distinctive, categories: perverse (or instrumental) evil and pure evil.  This division is by no means 
original.
4
  Perverse evil, as suggested by Irit Samet-Porat, is the performance of evil acts under 
the guise of moral certitude or permittance.
5
  The perversely evil agent can embody a wide range 
of mindsets.  There are three ways that immediately come to mind.  The individual can have a 
twisted moral code that rationalizes the act to be morally justified, have an alternative motive to 
commit evil acts (such as the desired utility of the act), or have an emotional breakdown of some 
                                                          
3
 Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (Greenwich: Fawcett Crest, 1973), 480. 
4
 See the following works: Colin McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Daniel 
M. Haybron, “Evil Characters,” American Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1999); and Irit Samet-Porat, 
“Satanic Motivations,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, no 41(2007). 
5
 Samet-Porat, “Satanic Motivations,” 78. 
5 
kind that dramatically deforms their moral character.  Perverse evil can arise in these different 
ways but the conceptual thought process behind it remains the same.  Haybron similarly uses the 
term “corrupt evil” to describe moral agents that culpably “choose evil” when they could have 
done the opposite, perhaps due to circumstances or an otherwise obscured character defect.
6
  Evil 
in all these senses is performed instrumentally for some reason other than its own sake. 
 Pure evil, on the other hand, is the performance of evil acts for their own sake—mirroring 
opposite the old adage “be good for goodness sake”.  The purely evil agent operates on the same 
level intellectually as any other normal person in that he/she can make the same moral 
evaluations, but is motivated to perform evil as evil rather than good as good.  In other words, 
these agents are attracted to evil for itself.  They, unlike perversely evil agents, cannot be 
straightforwardly accused of ignorance or some form of weakness.
7
  Purely evil agents care about 
morality, just not the side of the moral issue others would expect.  Satan is often mentioned as a 
paradigm case of doing evil on principle; but this case is not without some controversy.
8
 
 Most, if not all, instances of evil in ordinary matters are some derivable form of perverse 
evil.  Even the horrific actions of Hitler and his associates are representative of perverse or 
instrumental evil.  They did not commit genocide purely for the sadistic desire to kill others.  
Hitler not only had an agenda which included the desire of creating a master race, but also acted 
in such a way that he believed his actions were justified as good.  People who have done far lesser 
offenses than genocide have adopted the very same mindset, like the common criminal or 
murderer.  The major difference between such people and Hitler is in degree, but not in kind.  
Conceptually, both of their actions are a means to some desired end not resulting from pure 
principle.  Hitler presumably considered the wholesale destruction of an entire people the best 
                                                          
6
Haybron, “Evil Characters,” 141.  
7
Samet-Poret, “Satanic Motivations,” 79-80.  
8
 Section 1.2 will be devoted, in part, to this very issue. 
6 
way to achieve his end goals.  Further, it would be strange to think—at least in the case involving 
Hitler—that someone would murder or commit genocide just for the sake of doing it.      
 Perhaps the reason why most evil can be explained in terms of perversion (or corruption) 
is because of the nature of the agent’s judgments themselves.  The fact that judgments can go 
awry at every possible step in the deliberation process suggests that an agent’s motivation to 
commit murder or orchestrate genocide is very much a possibility, though hopefully a rare one.  
Hitler’s genocidal agenda was spurred by his nationalism and an ideology bent on racial purity 
(i.e. ethnocentrism).  Despite his role in the deaths of millions, Hitler seemed to have no 
overwhelming environmental cues from childhood that set him apart from anyone else; he had a 
warm and loving mother (though his father was a strict authoritarian).
9
  The question then is what 
caused him to show such disregard for others’ lives? 
 Fromm suggests that Hitler’s friendly and amicable nature was a role which he likely 
valued for its usefulness.
10
  Unlike the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde characters from Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s 1886 short story, Hitler could control which “personality” suited his situation.  But 
the assumption should not be made that all of his kindness was mere veneer.  Though Hitler 
possessed little to no affection for other people, he had a rather surprising care for animals—
especially his dog.
11
  In any case, with perversely evil agents like Hitler, subscribing to an abusive 
ideology or belief-system can change how one’s values are fulfilled.  When people succumb to 
bigotry and adopt a destructive agenda, such agents act out of misguided self-righteousness with 
“good” being used to identify the fulfillment of their (perverse) projects.      
It is important to note that kindness does not entail the work of a benevolent agent as 
much as cruelty does not entail the work of an evil agent.  Hitler’s actions, cruel and destructive 
                                                          
9
 Fromm, Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, 413-422. 
10
 Ibid., 470. 
11
 Ibid., 454. 
7 
in practice, had their beginnings in thought and were roused by motivation.  One’s actions after 
all do not exist in a vacuum.  They are traceable to an agent’s thought process and collection of 
motivations that weighs some actions over others.  The evaluation of evil acts as presented to the 
naked, empirical eye is incomplete.  Such an analysis taken at face value would fail to heed the 
advice mentioned earlier and would only scratch the surface of evil agency’s inner workings.  
This also seems to relate to some psychological structure underlying evil, within both perverse 
and pure forms, that will require further investigation in subsequent sections.         
 There are other instances of perverse evil with more complex parameters that need to be 
mentioned.  In particular, the anti-villain model
12
 offers some insight into complicated, evil 
personas.  Anakin Skywalker’s character development in the Star Wars saga is a peculiar 
example of the ambiguity that can exist between good and evil characterizations.  As a child, it 
was believed that Anakin was the “chosen one” of the Jedi order who would bring balance to the 
force.  But a series of unfortunate events, as well as some exposed character flaws and extremely 
poor decisions, changed Anakin and his future.   
Slavoj Zizek, in The Parallax View, argues that Anakin’s turn to evil was (or rather 
should be viewed as) due to his excessive attachment to the good.
13
  Anakin’s fall began with his 
ambition to excel in the Jedi ranks and then heightened with his desire to save Padme (from his 
dreams about death during childbirth).  This resulted in Anakin’s need for power (at any cost) to 
control their destinies.
14
  That is, he turned to evil through “an overwhelming desire to intervene, 
                                                          
12
 The anti-villain is an agent that is ambiguously evil.  He/she has desired ends that seem evil or nefarious 
but also possess heroic traits or virtues that make their ends more ethically-oriented than most villains. 
Like the concept of the anti-hero, these are literary devices intended to blur the lines between the “good 
guys” and the “bad guys” in story-telling narratives.     
13
Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge: MIT press, 2006), 100-103. 
14
 Richard Corliss, “Dark Victory,” Time Magazine: April 22, 2002.  
The following comments by George Lucas in this article seem to complement the assessment above: “He 
turns into Darth Vader because he gets attached to things. He can’t let go of things. He can’t let go of his 
mother; he can’t let go of his girlfriend. He can’t let go of things.”   
8 
to do Good, to go to the end for those he loves (Amidala).”
15
  These attachments, created out of 
Anakin’s love and devotion, took over and ultimately twisted his character.  The moment in 
which Anakin’s name changed to “Darth Vader” signals the culmination of Anakin’s moral 
transformation.  Mania, at first a symptom of Anakin’s attachment to good (i.e. his love for 
Padme), became a driving force for perverse evil causing him to overcompensate within his own 
moral evaluations.   
  With Emperor Palpatine’s manipulation, Anakin became enthralled by the rage and 
aggression brewing within him as he desperately attempted to prevent his dreams of Padme’s 
death from coming true.  These things led to appalling acts of infanticide, the destruction of the 
Jedi order, and the conclusion of Anakin’s fears culminating in a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The 
loss Anakin suffered from his mother’s death earlier in Attack of the Clones (2002) makes his 
mania sympathetic and his turn to perverse evil all the more tragic.  While people would hardly 
condone Anakin’s actions, such as the slaughter of children at the Jedi temple in Revenge of the 
Sith (2005), the tragic nature of Anakin and similar characters are not beyond sympathy.  By a 
strange twist of fate, Anakin’s love for others led him to commit great evils. 
 The anti-villain model adds a dynamic element to evil in moral discourse and further 
demonstrates the various kinds of perverse evil.  The social, psychological, and interpersonal 
conditions of evil agency are boundless in terms of literary resources.  Many stories and character 
models, with a few exceptions, mirror or emulate in distinct ways people’s lives in the real world.  
Cinematic and literary characters, though they may be a product of the mind, can possess some 
realism because the reader or viewer can relate to them like any other human being.  They can 
synthesize the details of others and make a personal connection with those characters.   
                                                          
15
 Ibid., 101. 
9 
Oftentimes these details, fictional or not, demonstrate untold variables which can give 
rise to evil.  If evil can come from the unlikeliest of sources where even an otherwise positive 
emotion such as love is not exempt from being a catalyst, then perhaps good and evil are dualities 
that overlap from time to time.  When imagination and experience combine with the power of 
narration, the notion of what is evil (and good) becomes slightly more opaque.  The parameters of 
evil, thus, expand and multiply when the depths of the individual’s psyche and one’s relationships 
with other people are explored.  The categorizations of perverse and pure evil can be further 
delineated when additional conditions and circumstances are included.  
 Zizek’s reasoning about the transformation of Anakin to Darth Vader could also be read 
as criticism of the laymen tendency to speak in absolutist terms.  Moral discourse is rife with 
instances of unconditional statements about good and evil while not carefully recognizing the 
meticulous processes that lead to making moral decisions.  While anyone familiar with ethical 
theory or who has taken a general philosophy course in ethics will already be aware of the pitfalls 
of absolutist ethics, it is important to emphasize this point before continuing.   
Individual characters hardly fit into ideologically pure models of good and evil, but the 
ethical construction of the Stars Wars universe seems to support this simplistic dichotomy.  With 
the Jedi and the Sith, George Lucas presents an ethical landscape in which the light and dark sides 
of the Force are unambiguously distinct and incapable of immersion.  Both “sides” are strict in 
their principles; the Sith seek power and domination, whereas the Jedi wish for peace and 
harmony.  Both also turn to the extreme in the defense of their ideals.  The Sith celebrate 
emotions as a source of strength even to the point of being consumed by it, while the Jedi reject 
all avenues of sensuality as a dangerous slippery slope and cultivate an ascetic lifestyle.  The 
multifarious parameters of evil outlined in this section hopefully show the error of such rigorous 
characterizations.   
10 
It does not seem farfetched to suggest that the concept of pure evil mentioned earlier 
arises from this excess in extremes.  Although Anakin’s lust for power was for the sake of some 
other end (i.e. love, glory, etc.), one could imagine a different set of parameters that results in a 
person motivated to act badly just for the sake of doing it.  Such a person would surely be far 
from the ordinary since people presumably want power, love, and glory for some other end (i.e. 
happiness) in much the same way many people desire money for the expressed purposes of 
spending it.  But, supposing the concept of pure evil is illusory, all evil conduct may be just a 
matter of perpetuating actions out of some (misguided) selfish endeavor.  In that case all evil 
would be reducible to perverse evil.  But that suggestion, at this time, is premature.      
In the case of money, is it possible for someone to just want money for its own sake?  
While currency by itself is nothing but the materials it is made of, its essential value need not be 
completely tied to its bartering value either.  The public value of currency can be co-opted into an 
intrinsic value on the same level as someone may value health or joy for its own sake.  The 
Ebenezer Scrooge character seems to best embody an agent with the mental inner-workings of 
desiring money-qua-money.  This agent, a plutocrat to the extreme, seems to literally define the 
possession of money as intrinsically valuable.  As someone may deem “bachelor” tautological to 
“unmarried man,” Scrooge intimately associates “money” as tautological to “something desirable 
for itself”.  Furthermore, Scrooge’s miserly lifestyle up to the point of his ethical conversion 
serves as testament to his valuation of money as an end to itself.  Scrooge hoards money, seeks to 
possess as much of it as he can, and as a result spends as little of it as necessary even at the cost 
of his own well-being (e.g. when he adamantly refuses to work the heater in order to save money 
despite being noticeably affected by the temperature in A Christmas Carol (1984)).  
In other words, Scrooge does not revel in his wealth but subsists as if money had no value 
other than being possessed and continually accumulated.  His motivational framework does not 
seem to attribute an instrumental value of money such as using it for pleasure or to acquire power 
11 
over others.  Scrooge simply did not care about others and presumably only had a care when 
money was at stake.  Perhaps, as a businessman, Scrooge did initially place an instrumental value 
on money.  At some point, though, it ceased to solely have that value for him.  But one can only 
know so much about a person.  Even a literary character has limitations to what one can 
legitimately know about his/her thought processes—which makes this inquiry extremely difficult 
to discuss.   
But this in part demonstrates the importance of exploring in more detail the inner 
workings of an agent’s judgments and motivations as they relate to action so that one can better 
understand people like Scrooge—as well as how one’s own motivations work to produce 
judgment and encourage certain actions.  Scrooge and his penny-pinching ways may seem largely 
trivial for most people but the prospect of doing evil for evil’s sake operates along a similar 
thought process.  The question then arises: Can a similar case also be made for agents that desire 
evil-qua-evil (i.e. purely evil motivation)?  Does pure evil have some test case distinct from 
perverse evil?  
Instances of pure evil, though, are harder to isolate from garden-variety perverse evil.  It 
has been suggested that some types of serial killers or psychopathic murderers—like “thrill 
killer”
16
 Robert Alton Harris—may qualify as realistic models of pure evil.
17
  But one could argue 
that the existence of a harsh childhood upbringing may have shaped them into such monsters.  
For evil to be done for its own sake, there can be no pretense to instrumental ends underlying the 
agent’s motivations or possible disparity in their moral understanding.  Pure evil, to be clearly 
distinguishable from perverse characterization, must present a clear and conscious desire to do 
                                                          
16
 The term “thrill killing” is premeditated murder, oftentimes of a complete random stranger, motivated 
primarily by the pure excitement of the act itself with no clear indication of mental instability. One 
possible example, but nonetheless not a clear indication of the matter, is the famous Leopold and Loeb 
case in 1924. 
17
Haybron, “Evil Characters,” 139. 
12 
evil.  While there can be secondary or auxiliary reasons for an action, the purely evil agent’s 
primary motivation must be with respect to the knowledge that he/she does X because X is evil. 
This conceptualization of evil treads into enigmatic waters.  The kind of agent that simply 
commits an evil act, say murder, for its own sake seems beyond comprehension.  There is a 
tendency to suggest that there must be some reason other than pure malevolency that lurks behind 
the agent’s thoughts—that evil emanates from some sort of self-interested code or perverse 
gratification and thus, cannot be done for its own sake.  Perhaps (as suggested above with the 
Scrooge character) this is due to the difficulty of fully determining the motivations and/or 
intentions of people from the outside looking in.  If, in response to the question of why commit 
murder, someone were to say, “I just wanted to murder someone today. I had nothing 
instrumental to gain or lose from such an action. In fact, I knew that it was a despicably evil thing 
to do,” then it would not be unreasonable to be skeptical of that person’s own reasons and perhaps 
sanity.  
There might be grounds to question the psychological health of purely evil agents.  If 
many serial killers come from a background of abuse and violent upbringings, then there may not 
have been sufficient development of a general sense of empathy for others.  Charles Darwin, in 
The Descent of Man, argues that the endowment of well-marked social instincts— among them 
the parental and filial affections—constitute the building blocks of a moral sense or conscience.
18
  
Feelings of sympathy, friendship, and love arise within social groups in the form of advantageous 
traits for natural selection.  If individuals within a group are amicable toward each other in these 
ways, then the group as a whole has a better chance of survival and the individuals within to 
propagate future generations.  Sociability, for Darwin, signifies the beginnings of a moral point of 
view because an individual’s behavior includes considering the welfare of others outside of 
                                                          
18
 Charles Darwin, “Origin of the Moral Sense” or “Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the 
Lower Animals”, Decent of Man (New York: Random House Inc., 1936), (Ch. IV) 471-495. 
13 
familial ties, not just for oneself and one’s progeny.  Serial killers in this respect are sociopathic, 
for they have failed to reach those points of development and perhaps cannot sincerely appreciate 
the communication of moral imperatives.  
To commit evil acts just for the sake of doing them seems to exemplify a lack of empathy 
for others which significantly distinguish ordinary agents from the amoral, the perverse, and 
especially the purely evil.  But sociopathy and the qualities it entails are not required—nor do 
they seem sufficient—to be included in the domain of pure evil.  Perhaps these associations are 
just incidental for some instances of pure evil.  As such, until adequate reasoning is presented to 
the contrary, one should leave sociability and psychological instability as possible but not 
necessary characteristics of purely evil agency.  Like Glaucon’s model of the perfectly unjust 
man in the Republic,
19
 the purely evil agent should be allowed the same access to the rewards or 
goods of any other normally-situated person.  One should “subtract nothing” from the agent in 
order to see in full view “his own way of life.”
20
   Otherwise, one could end up making ad hoc 
appeals to undermine pure evil and reduce it to a sophisticated, self-delusional variant of perverse 
evil.  Just as Glaucon implored Socrates to avoid detracting from the unjust person the means of 
power, wealth, friends, and even the skill of a “clever craftsman” so that one can come to terms 
with injustice itself,
21
 purely evil agency should also not be diluted until one has grasped the full 
extent of its impact in moral discourse and whether it fits within the ethical landscape.  Then—
and only then—should one tamper with it in light of some objectionable grounds.   
Nevertheless, the characteristics that pertain to thrill killers may have some relation to 
purely evil agency.  Gary Watson notes that while thrill killer Robert Alton Harris’ abusive 
childhood does make people less inclined to use some “reactive epithets”, it should not exempt 
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Harris from judgments that he is “brutal, vicious, heartless, mean.”
22
  Similarly purely evil agents, 
from the perspective of those who affirm the motivational attractiveness of good as opposed to 
evil, can be criticized in this manner.  However, these accusations hardly prove useful.  Most 
agents seem to be disposed towards what is considered the good—that is, whatever they 
normatively construe to be good.  But again, just as one can posit supererogatory agents or “moral 
saints” on one end of the extreme, there seems to be a kind of agent that can embrace, as the 
motivating incentive of their actions, a will to do what is evil because it is evil.
23
  Is the purely 
evil agent just the result of some conceptual game or is there actual substance to it?  Returning 
once again to the beginning of this inquiry, the question of approach is critical in order to address 
the issues.  It is not just a matter of what an evil agent does that makes him evil, but how and why 
he arrives at those actions as well.   
Though thrill serial killers seem to reflect some features of pure evil, they are not 
adequate test cases.  Instead, some philosophers have turned to literature to cite possible 
examples.  McGinn and Haybron, in their musings on pure evil, both focus on the character of 
John Claggart in Melville’s Billy Budd.
24
  Unlike other evil characters, his nature is described as 
being of “natural depravity” and an evil nature “not engendered by vicious training or corrupting 
books or licentious living.”
25
  In the novel, Claggart—a high ranking officer—conspires to harm 
lowly sailor Billy Budd for seemingly no benefit other than just to do it.  The calm and calculated 
demeanor of the man further underscores the quiet yet sinister force that lurks within him.  The 
purely evil agent as such understands the moral gravity of his actions and exhibits a natural 
preference to do evil.  Melville suggests this natural preference, like a scorpion’s nature to sting, 
                                                          
22
 Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” Responsibility, 
Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (New York: 
Cambridge Press, 1988), 271. 
23
 Section 3.2 will further explore this notion, sometimes called “the mirror thesis”. 
24
McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 63 ; Haybron, “Evil Characters,” 131. 
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attracts Claggart to the malevolence of evil which would repel ordinary men.
26
  McGinn rightly 
recognizes that one cannot simply explain this kind of character as one could the average rogue.
27
  
Pure evil is often cloaked, as it is with Claggart, behind a convincing façade and operates on an 
entirely new level than perverse evil.
28
   
 To stubbornly characterize such evil as simply brute viciousness is to betray the most 
terrifying feature of purely evil agents: their self-aware, astute intellect.  Pure evil agency here 
has a subtle, almost Machiavellian, nature that undercuts the conventional descriptions of evil as a 
bestial, impulsive force.  Similar to Erich Fromm’s earlier warning, individuals should be wary of 
putting too much stock in the physical identity of evil agency—how an agent looks or appears.  
This relates to Machiavelli’s infamous tract The Prince where rulers are advised to use 
appearances to their advantage.  A ruler that can seem to display good and admirable qualities 
and not have to continually observe them is in the best situation to rule.
29
  The purely evil agent 
may also exercise this ability to control how he/she looks (to others).  If an evil agent does not 
need to be “dressed” a certain way to be evil, then perhaps it is unnecessary for a purely evil 
agent to manifest all their evil qualities at once or consistently but merely know how and when to 
make use of them. 
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 The difficulty in clearly portraying real-life instances of purely evil agency should not 
discount it being a plausible conceptual feature in moral discourse.  While the rarity and 
enigmatic nature of pure evil may yield doubts about its conceptual coherency, literary and/or 
cinematic sources to the contrary should not be ignored.  Perhaps the reason why one cannot 
adequately identify a purely evil agent in reality is because, unlike the exploratory novel or film, 
people can only know so much about other’s inner feelings and motivations.  One’s own inner 
states even seem inscrutable at times.  As such, particular serial killers may resemble purely evil 
agents in some way because criminal psychologists in confined rooms can, given enough time, 
ascertain their psychological makeup.  However, these examples take away some of the 
exceptional aspects which literary and cinematic cases offer with far more clarity—as much as 
one can hope to obtain at any rate. 
 Nonetheless, the multifarious parameters explored here lend a flexible perspective to 
explore evil’s underpinnings.  But these remarks about evil are merely a preliminary to a much 
more thorough analysis of evil—pure evil in particular.  One aspect that still needs to be 
synthesized into the dual notions of evil outlined here is the possible implications on moral 
psychology.  Just as there is a wide variety of character types that can be classified as evil, the 
psychology of evil agency may not be so simple.  Before embarking on the metaethical details of 
this topic, there are some contentious issues to explore concerning the mind-set or mental state(s) 






1.2 “Evil, be thou my Good” 
 Just as evil can have many faces, one must be attentive to its copious roots.  As the 
previous section indicated, evil can manifest in peculiar ways.  What this says about the 
psychology of evil-doers may equally vary.  Michael Stocker suggests that philosophers have far 
too simplified the cognitive structures within moral psychology, especially when it comes to 
agents desiring what is bad.
30
  It is important to be wary of hasty generalizations.  Evil characters 
cannot simply be pigeonholed into broad attitudinal categories.  Thus, to complete these 
introductory remarks on evil, one must look into its psychological dynamics and what can be 
construed from the previous section’s division of evil into perverse and pure forms.      
Many agents, of course, can be explained quite easily.  The psychological mechanics of 
mental neuroses, in terms of childhood development and education, fit very well with numerous 
perverse serial killers and sociopaths.  Others have twisted moral codes, like Hitler, with 
intermingling cases exhibiting strong archetypal characteristics that stretch the boundaries of 
perverse evil.  In this vein, it was suggested earlier that human emotions can sometimes take on 
absurd levels of obsession, fear, and anger and push individuals to the extremes of action.  
Anakin Skywalker’s turn to evil could be explained in this way by his single-minded pursuit of 
personal glory and obsession with losing all that he loves.  The source that signified this turning 
point—Anakin’s love of his wife and their welfare—was, for Zizek, something one would 
normally classify as praiseworthy or good if it had not led Anakin to results that utterly maligned 
its moral value.
31
  Similar characters, such as Captain Ahab and Achilles, could also be explained 
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in terms of obsession and fear.
32
  Even then, however, there are exceptions which elude 
straightforward assessment.  How does purely evil agency fit into this conceptual scheme?  
 With evil agency of any kind, many philosophers think that “bitterness and other states of 
mind constitute a sufficient motivation for immoral action”.
33
  While this is a strong candidate for 
explaining all sorts of perverse agents, there are some that think the pure evil model also falls into 
this psychological rationalization.  Roy W. Perrett (among others) suggests that for an agent to be 
evil, “action has to flow from a particular kind of depraved character”.
34
  Depravity, however, is a 
sign of perversion and purely evil agents as described in the previous section are above being 
driven by instrumental desires as the basis for their motivation to act.  That is, pure evil is as 
much a principled stand as its contrary, the moral saint, who does good for its own sake beyond 
what is morally essential.  Some philosophers go even further and question the coherence of evil-
qua-evil motivation entirely.  Immanuel Kant in particular argued that it embodied an absurd-like 
demonic malevolence which can only be possessed by an inhuman creature; that is, such agency 
cannot be fully instantiated in human beings.
35
      
 Are evil agents, perversely and purely evil alike, determined by a largely negative moral 
psychology? And furthermore does this overlapping psychology threaten section 1.1’s conceptual 
                                                                                                                                                                             
it.”  This brings extra meaning to one of Friedrich Nietzsche’s oft-cited quotes from Beyond Good and Evil 
[sec. 146]: “Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster.” 
32
 Perhaps the white whale, also known as Moby Dick, took more than just Ahab’s leg but also his pride. 
Ahab’s single-minded pursuit of the whale can be interpreted as a fervent obsession to regain his 
wounded pride and peace of mind. It follows that Ahab’s willingness to sacrifice all mortal interests—
including the welfare of his crew and ultimately himself— represents a perverse obsession fueled by 
character defect. Similarly, Achilles pursuit of immortal glory in Troy (2004) suggests a fear of becoming 
insignificant—of being forgotten. While the circumstances are different, the characters both embody an 
obsession taken to perverse levels. Anakin, like Ahab and Achilles, is a character that demonstrates one of 
the many paths towards [perversely] evil agency.    
33
 Samet-Porat, “Satanic Motivations,” 85. 
34
 Roy W. Perrett, “Evil and Human Nature,” The Monist 85, no. 2 (2002): 305. Also see McGinn, Ethics, 
Evil, and Fiction (1997); Haybron, “Evil Characters” (1999); and Samet-Porat, “Satanic Motivations” (2007) 
for similar commentary of evil’s nature stemming from predominantly negative features of human 
emotion. 
35
 Immanuel Kant refers to this as the devilish or diabolical will in Religion within the Bounds of Bare 
Reason. This will be explored later in section 2.3 and chapter 3 as a whole.  
19 
distinction between perverse and pure evil?  In order to preserve this conceptual distinction from 
collapsing into one all-inclusive category, one must question the hypothesis that evil is principally 
rooted in negative states of mind.  That is, one must explore the possibility that evil can result 
from motivational elements other than bitterness and hatred.  These things are largely deemed 
instrumental features of moral motivation and not befitting of purely evil agency.  Additionally, 
the psychological dynamics of intentional evil must be clarified with a distinctive example of 
evil-qua-evil motivation. 
 The debate over Milton’s Satan as a paradigm case of evil has been a noticeable object of 
discussion over the years.
36
  And it is a suitable example to test the claim that evil agency is 
rooted in negative and corrupting psychological states.  The iconic phrase “Evil, be thou my 
Good”
37
 has inspired discussion about whether Satan is really an evil agent or actually a closet 
lover of what is good.  This is important in that it is an attempt at genuinely depicting the 
intentional attitude of evil agency.  If Satan and other evil agents are identifiable as closet lovers 
of what is good, then their characteristics and subsequent mental states are nothing but (negative) 
reactions towards the existent moral code.  Evil becomes synonymous with mere deviancy, 
something indicative of a rebellious teenager.  In other words, agents who are believed to 
exemplify or embrace evil are rather perverse agents redefining what (they think) is good to their 
own purposes—perhaps subconsciously. 
 Considering the storyline of Paradise Lost, there are many philosophers that are 
sympathetic to this interpretation.  “Evil, be thou my Good” is uttered by Satan after rebelling 
against God, losing, and as a result being banished forever to his own hell.  His emotions—
bitterness, rage, pride—are pouring out as he comes to grips with the situation.  It is at this point 
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that Satan gathers his thoughts and bolsters his resolve.  His future aims are attuned to the pursuit 
of evil as an adversary to God.  
 Anscombe suggests that Satan sees his evil as a good in the sense that good is the “intact 
liberty in the unsubmissiveness of [his] will.”
38
  In other words, Satan by revising his moral aims 
has created his own sense of good in defiance of God’s good.  He seems to acknowledge from the 
standpoint of morality, or specifically in Paradise Lost, from God’s moral perspective, that his 
defiance is contrary to what is deemed good among the rest of God’s creation.  But McNaughton 
points out that Satan—if he is a closet lover of the good—would be using the term “evil” 
descriptively rather than in a normal evaluative way.
39
  That is, he is using “evil” in an inverted-
commas sense.  Essentially the declaration “Evil, be thou my Good” can be interpreted as 
semantic wordplay.  McNaughton, along with Anscombe, would say that Satan does not pursue 
evil because it is evil.
40
  Just as Anakin Skywalker declares to Obi Wan in Revenge of the Sith 
(2005) that “From my point of view the Jedi are evil,”
41
 the suggestion above is that Satan views 
himself, his actions, and motivations as good even though he uses the label of “evil”.  He exalts 
evil not for what it is, but for what it represents for him.  Defiance is the means by which Satan 
confirms his immovable pride and unsubmissiveness.  This is what Anscombe and McNaughton 
mean when Satan is construed as a closet lover of the good.  
 While this is something one would expect of a perversely evil agent, the purely evil agent 
is someone who is evil precisely because of the evaluative meaning of evil itself.  Milton’s Satan 
does seem to embody the bitterness and negativity linked with perverse qualities of evil.  As 
mentioned previously, some are sympathetic to this interpretation of Milton’s Satan, largely 
because of the specifics of the narrative.  The details surrounding Satan’s motivations seem 
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overly tied down to the circumstances of his fall.  The sting of Satan’s recent defeat and his 
obdurate pride are contributing factors to the persona presented by Milton and lend support to 
Anscombe’s account at face value.  Similar reasoning led Samet-Porat to be wary of appealing to 
Satan as an exemplar of evil.
42
  Anscombe and McNaughton’s interpretation, however, is not 
indisputable.  Strong reasoning for a different interpretation of Satan’s intentions is available—
one that does not support him as a closet lover of the good. 
 When Milton’s Satan states “Evil, be thou my Good”, what could he have been 
promoting or pursuing?  What were his intentions?  As Anscombe already suggested, one could 
interpret Satan’s evil as redefining his own view of good in direct opposition to God—similar to 
how an ordinary villain could view his actions in relation to the “goodie-two-shoes” hero.
43
  That 
is, he is a closet lover of the good.  He pursued evil because it embodied the means for expressing 
insubordination to God.  What was evil from God’s perspective became his new good.  The 
underlying premise here is that Satan must see these intentions as good in some way and thus 
“evil” is a mere placeholder, an empty term no longer having any original content.  Good for 
Anscombe is multiform and all that is needed to confirm Satan as operating under the aspect of 
good is his intention of “wanting” it.
44
  But this view of evil intention makes it impossible for an 
agent such as Satan (or any agent at all for that matter) to pursue evil and simultaneously desire 
evil for itself.  Thus, there seems to be no such thing as a positive expression of evil intention; it 
must manifest indirectly as a negative reaction (e.g. bitterness, hatred, etc).  This conclusion 
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though seems premature, as if there is not a corresponding interpretation available for reading 
Satan’s anthem “Evil, be thou my Good” in a way that supports purely evil motivation.   
 There are some questionable portions of Anscombe’s account that warrant attention.  
First, as previously mentioned, Satan’s pursuit of evil is done within the moral framework of 
what God deems good and bad (or evil).  But then what sense can be made out of the idea that 
Satan is redefining the good for himself?  Like most perversely evil agents, it is argued that Satan 
twisted good and evil to serve his own purposes.  This is not the same thing though as redefining 
a new conception of the good if it is parasitic on an existent moral framework.  Robert Dunn 
likewise points out that “Milton’s Satan does not have a substantive theory of the good under 
which…the actions that promote them count as goods.”
45
  In other words, Satan does not have a 
stand-alone theory of moral goodness and badness.  This opens up the possibility that Satan could 
have merely reversed the direction of his moral compass to evil for itself instead of being a closet 
lover of the good.  The mere fact that someone wants some particular end does not in itself 
demonstrate that the agent thinks it is good.  On the contrary, there is evidence that may suggest 
Satan does see his aim(s) as bad or evil in the normal evaluative sense and the term “good” within 
the phrase “Evil, be thou my Good” is being utilized in a different way.   
 Before uttering that iconic phrase, Satan declared, “So farewell hope, and with hope 
farewell fear, Farewell remorse: all good is lost to me.”
46
  This short passage preceding Satan’s 
anthem can be interpreted differently.  If Satan aligns himself to evil with the thought(s) that there 
can be no hope in what he does, then by what means can he be construed as a closet lover of the 
good?  Anscombe’s working assumption is that one presumably wants/prefers the good because it 
confers some perceived benefit or value.  And in this vein, to prefer something over another is to 
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make a “good” of it.  But Stocker makes a strong case against such a blatant assumption.
47
  Not 
only could the believed good (as opposed to a perceived good) fail to attract Satan—as seems to 
be the case with the previous quotation—but he could be attracted instead to the actual, believed 
bad.  Stocker maintains that “only against a certain assumed background of agent mood and 
interest does citing the believed good make an act intelligible.”
48
  The background of Satan’s 
moral disagreements does not seem to stem at all from a difference in perceived goods (i.e. “My 
good” vs. “God’s good”).  But rather, Satan’s moral disagreements are rooted in the motivational 
inefficacy of the believed good; he is motivated to do evil precisely because of the fact that it is 
not good.  In this sense, Satan’s pursuit of evil takes the place of what would ordinarily be a 
person’s pursuit of good but there are no illusions—as with perversely evil agents—that one is 
committed to evil as evil.  A closer look at Paradise Lost may possibly unhinge Anscombe’s and 
McNaughton’s position in this way. 
 If it is the case that Milton’s Satan does not substantively revise moral goodness and 
badness but only reverses his aim(s) from good to evil, then one must re-evaluate the psychology 
of evil intentions in light of the details to determine whether Satan could conceptually be a purely 
evil agent—positively affirming evil for itself.  Before Eve is tempted in the Garden of Eden, 
Milton presents a self-reflective moment from Satan as he infiltrates Paradise: “But neither here 
seek I, no nor in heaven To dwell, unless by mastering heaven’s supreme; Nor hope to be myself 
less miserable By what I seek.”
49
  The mood and interest of Satan here seems contrary to any 
label of closet lover of the good.  He not only recognizes that his intention to do evil will do 
nothing to cure his misery, but also accepts and anticipates the outcome with the utmost of his 
being.  He sees himself as his own master rebelliously renouncing moral goodness, but not to the 
extent that he reassigns his moral values.  Rather than a reassignment of what is good and evil, 
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Satan appears to align his motivational priorities inversely against his moral judgments without 
changing or twisting the moral source.  Otherwise, Satan’s expressions of pride and envy would 
not make sense if he were a perversely evil agent with a twisted sense of self-righteousness on the 
same level as Hitler.  The triumph over God’s newly created project, Adam and Eve, is Satan’s 
demonstration of evil’s pure power against the good.  He has went “all-in” with the motivational 
shift from good to evil and, in Thrasymachean fashion, wants evil to outdo good in this new war 
against God.  As much as Satan may seemingly derive his evil from “negative” sources, he 
expresses his pride, bitterness, and envy positively for itself rather than reactively.   
 Given these new developments, Dunn rightly suggests “Evil, be thou my Good” could be 
understood as Satan making evil his new “criterion of success for any related action” instead of 
“targeting” [and redefining] a value or good.
50
  Milton’s Satan could consider the evil in defying 
God as good in the sense that one can generally consider the success of performing a designated 
task as good.  For example, if a person aims to carry out a bank heist, he/she can judge the 
success of that action as good without having to normatively reassign his/her understanding of 
moral goodness.  In other words, a hypothetical bank robber can very well know and operate 
within an existent moral code that condemns bank robbing, but have aims which motivationally 
dispose him/her to do what is bad.   
Thus, when Milton’s Satan enshrines evil as his new good, there are other ways to 
interpret the use of “good” besides normatively.  The statement, “That was a good bank robbery I 
did,” can equate to, “I did a good job robbing that bank,” rather than a commitment to the 
normative value judgment, “I think robbing a bank is a (morally) good thing to do.”  Dunn would 
label the former statement as invoking, “a formal sense of ‘good’, in which any aim whatsoever 
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counts as good” as a matter of success.
51
  This sense of good is far removed from the good being 
evoked by Anscombe and McNaughton—an evaluative good. 
McNaughton, like Anscombe, thinks Satan’s reflections on the good lost to him reveals 
his motives to do evil.  Satan chooses the path of evil because “it represents [his] only remaining 
hope of power.”
52
  Exiled, cursed, and with a wounded pride, Satan resorts to evil as a tool to 
exalt his unsubmissiveness and affirm his egocentric defiance.  This interpretation, though, places 
undue weight on good to the extent that to will anything is to desire the good in some way.  One 
should, naturally, be able to account for genuine cases where the agent’s circumstances and 
motivational background suggest a twisted conception of the good (e.g. Hitler); but it should not 
be set as the default condition for every agent who utilizes the term “good” in a moral situation.  
Not only does “good” lose its substantive meaning by being tautologically subsumed under 
“whatever one positively wills,” but also ordinary moral discourse is turned on its head.   
There is a conceptual gap in Anscombe and McNaughton’s interpretations that does not 
adequately match the psychological force of the term “evil” in moral discourse.  When said with 
tremendous vigor that “X is positively (or purely) evil,” it is not always meant to denote that X is 
operating under a twisted conception of the good.  On the contrary, X could be operating under an 
entirely different framework than any common moral agent.  As such, the purely evil agent’s 
motivational disposition operates in the reverse embracing evil because of its “evilness” instead 
of evil because of some (falsely) perceived good in the act.  While certain conditions are required 
to be purely evil and these conditions are both intricate and rare, there is no reason at this time to 
reject the conceptual plausibility of pure evil.  Not all evil agents possess the same mindset and it 
is the mindset and intentions of an agent (including emotions) that ultimately distinguishes 
perverse and pure evil.  




 McNaughton, Moral Vision, 142. 
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 Satan is surely under no illusions.  He knows his aims are evil and that they are 
detrimental to his condition (i.e. will not make him any less miserable).  As such if there is any 
good that he seeks, it is the success in action of his evil aims rather than reinventing good under 
the label of “evil”.  Most people may feel some kind of cognitive dissonance or mental pangs of 
guilt for actively doing what they know and believe to be wrong.  But certain individuals, like the 
character of Satan, are exceptions that show it is possible to positively acknowledge evil for what 
it is and perform it regardless.  Samet-Porat has similar reservations about Anscombe and 
McNaughton’s account(s) of Milton’s Satan, but is hesitant about treating Milton’s Satan “as the 
paradigmatic satanic agent.”
53
  In fact, she seems more inclined toward the example of Richard 
the III (via Shakespeare’s depiction) and the peculiar case surrounding Nazi propagandist Joseph 
Goebbels.  However, Samet-Porat does also insist that not all evil should be rendered perversely 
evil, to use “evil” in an inverted-commas sense.
54
 
 Granting the philosophical and theological baggage of this character, there can at least 
conceptually be positive expressions of intentional evil.  One should not presume evil fits any 
particular label or identity, even the most commonsensical; for one now has reason to think that 
some evil agents are not possibly determined by a negative moral psychology.  Bitterness and 
negativity on the whole are nevertheless pervasive contingent features of evil.  These conceptual 
and psychological insights advance our inquiry into the metaethics of evil by demonstrating the 
sheer elasticity of evil’s framework.  Such open-endedness, though, will prove to further mire this 
inquiry with challenging questions once the intricacies of agent motivation and judgment are 
under consideration.    
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1.3 Developing a Metaethical Understanding of Evil 
 Section 1.1 identified and examined perverse and pure conceptualizations of evil.  This 
greatly expanded the parameters under which agents can be assessed as “evil”.  Additionally after 
considering the complex underpinnings of evil’s moral psychology (with characters such as 
Milton’s Satan) in section 1.2, these dynamics need to be taken into account within an overall 
metaethical understanding of evil.  That is, surveying the moral and psychological landscape of 
evil establishes groundwork for analyzing metaethics appropriate to this thesis.  The previous 
section proposed some interesting conclusions about purely evil agents—that such characters 
with evil-qua-evil motivations are conceptually plausible and they perhaps need not be rooted in 
negative psychological states.  But, this conceptual depiction of evil is incomplete without some 
corresponding metaethical context to make sense of it.  How is one to understand the inner 
workings of an evil agent’s motivations in relation to their judgments and actions?      
 The metaethics relevant to this thesis involves two opposing philosophical positions: 
internalism and externalism.  The focus will be only on a specific type of internalism and 
externalism: motivation internalism/externalism.  Nonetheless, these frameworks have further 
uses for a number of philosophical disciplines.  In epistemology, for instance, internalism about 
justification asserts that justification for beliefs is necessarily derivable from internal factors like 
the mental contents of an agent’s consciousness.  In philosophy of language, the debate between 
internalism and externalism arises from questions about the origin of semantic meaning—whether 
the meaning of a word is cognitively (i.e. internally) construed or rather determined externally by 
environmental conditions.   
There are a few variations of internalism/externalism in metaethics.  Bernard Williams is 
well known for highlighting internal and external reasons for action—otherwise known as 
reasons internalism and reasons externalism—which explores the relation between one’s moral 
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judgment and the justificatory reasons for that judgment.
55
  The internalism and externalism 
under consideration here is closely related to—but regardless logically independent of—
Williams’ distinction. 
 Motivation internalism/externalism explores how an agent’s evaluative judgment that “It 
is morally good or not morally good to do X” relates to any subsequent motivation to act in 
accordance with that judgment.  Suppose an agent expresses the judgment “It is not morally good 
to take another person’s possessions” or more specifically “I should not steal that person’s wallet” 
during a moment of moral deliberation.  By expressing this judgment about his/her moral 
belief(s) about some matter, the agent presumably considers the judgment authoritative and 
action-guiding.  Whether the agent’s moral beliefs are considered propositional claims—
statements capable of being either true or false—or mere emotive expressions
56
 is an important 
issue to consider but not relevant to the aims of this inquiry.  Regardless of whether cognitivism 
or non-cognitivism is the correct metaethical position with regards to moral beliefs/judgments, 
they can (perhaps) occupy both sides of the debate between motivation internalism and 
externalism.
57
  So, for the sake of brevity, this inquiry will focus exclusively on the competing 
theses of motivation internalism/externalism and how evil can be used as counterexamples to 
either support or refute each motivational framework.  
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 The motivation internalist posits a necessary
58
 or non-contingent connection such that 
when an agent affirms the judgment about stealing being wrong it is—ceteris paribus—sufficient 
enough to be motivating to act.  In other words, under motivation internalism, the sincere 
approval of one’s moral judgments establishes a motivating element within the judgment itself.  
To borrow Richard Joyce’s phrasing in The Myth of Morality, motivation internalism is the view 
that “it is necessary and a priori that any agent who judges that one of his available actions is 
morally obligatory will have some (defeasible) motivation to perform that action (emphasis in 
original).”
59
  The underlying premise here seems to be that moral judgments by definition contain 
an implicit “must-be-doneness”.  As such, an agent’s moral judgments serve to broadcast one’s 
motivational dispositions.  When someone forms a moral judgment but then at the next moment 
indicates motivations to do the contrary, the internalist view quite easily pinpoints the source of 
the bewilderment; there is some connection here that agents generally have between their 
judgments and subsequent motivations to act on them.    
Whether the agent successfully acts according to his/her judgment is irrelevant to the 
existence of said motivation.  For the internalist, the agent’s judgment merely lends sufficient 
motivation for the agent to want to act on it.  If a moral judgment fails to even minimally affect 
the decision of the agent, then one could plausibly question the validity (in terms of sincerity) of 
the judgment; as a result internalism would remain unblemished.  A general outline is provided 
(see Figure 1 below) to demonstrate the motivation internalist framework in two stages; the first 
stage is within the domain of an agent’s deliberation and the other stage an agent’s motivation to 
act as a result of that assessment.   
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The above staging together represents the motivation internalist thesis (MIT).  At the 
basic level, it is a working model that proposes to make sense of the motivational profile of 
human beings when making moral claims.  What does it mean when an agent expresses a moral 
judgment about some state of affairs?  Simply, for the internalist, an agent’s definitive moral 
judgment seems to also establish the agent’s motivational disposition to act in that way—even if 
that motivation is not forthcoming and ultimately fails to spur the agent to act in that manner.   
In other words, if an agent sincerely forms an evaluative moral judgment and 
subsequently encounters a situation where the judgment demands a course of action, then the 
agent has sufficient motivation to be inclined towards the execution of that judgment in one’s 
actions.  If someone is not motivated by their moral judgments and as a result fails to be moved 
by them in the context of a situation, then the internalist can critique the conditions surrounding 
  Stage One 
       (S1) 
 
 
  Stage Two 
       (S2) 
 
  Motivation 
  Internalist 
     Thesis 
      (MIT) 
S1: An agent (A) forms a moral judgment (J) if A judges 
and sincerely affirms J such that J has the property of 
being an action-guiding moral belief. 
S2: An agent (A) is motivated to act on a judgment (J) 
if A forms J such that J establishes motivating reasons 
to act in some situation (S) which A sincerely affirms 
as morally required. 
MIT: Given the transition from S1 to S2, there exists a 
conceptual relationship betweeen approving a moral 
judgment and being motivated in some way to act on 
that judgment. 
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the person’s judgments or beliefs and explain the disconnect in terms of ignorance, insincerity of 
judgment, irrationality, or perhaps even mental defect.
60
   
 On the other hand, the motivational externalist, as Shafer-Landau puts it, “endorse[s] the 
conceptual possibility of one who sincerely makes moral judgments but is entirely unmoved by 
them.”
61
  In other words, the externalist does not think that there is a necessary and a priori 
connection between approving of a moral judgment and having the motivation to act on it.  
Rather, the connection is contingent on external factors which may override how agents are 
motivated by and/or relate to their pronounced moral judgments.  As such, considering the very 
possibility that an agent’s judgment and motivation to act can be disassociated makes one partial 
to an externalist view.  Contrary to internalists, externalists do not regard judgments as 
necessarily motivating even in the sense of an agent wanting to act on it.  Similarly, Robert 
Lockie describes motivation externalism as merely doubting the essential motivating influence of 
judgment as opposed to the extreme view that judgments are never (internally) motivating.
62
  Just 
as internalists grant that motivations can fail to develop into the appropriate action, the externalist 
need not deny that judgments often have motivating force for agents—only that this does not, 
thereby, establish a necessary conceptual relation between the two.  As such, the internalist 
framework outlined above in Figure 1 only offers one of presumably many thought processes by 
which an agent can be motivated to act.   
Even though the externalist criticizes the transition from S1 to S2 in Figure 1, this does 
not prevent the externalist from potentially agreeing with some of the internalist explanations for 
particular cases.  There are likely legitimate instances where an agent is being insincere with 
his/her judgments or perhaps has schizophrenia or a psychological defect of some kind that severs 
the strong connection between agent judgment and motivation.  But the real question to begin 
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with is whether the connection is strong enough to be considered necessary and a priori.   Many 
partial to the externalist view attempt to devise agent counterexamples that try to refute the 
MIT.
63
  Amorality is one such counterexample where an agent simply withdraws from morality 
altogether while still sincerely professing knowledge of moral rightness and wrongness.  The 
complexities of this debate extend among numerous philosophers with a noteworthy paper trail of 
publications.
64
   
The conceptual and psychological conditions of evil that were outlined in the previous 
sections concern these metaethical positions in more ways than one.  This inquiry, though, will 
restrict itself to the disputes between motivational internalists and externalists.  Many ethical 
systems contain basic axioms that depend on such metaethical foundations.  A triumph for either 
position could significantly change the moral landscape as it is understood by (normative) ethical 
theory.  Platonic and Kantian ethics, for instance, are predominantly internalist whereas most 
sentimentalist and non-intellectualist moral theories tend towards an externalist view (e.g. Hume).  
There are discrepancies, though, among internalist structures that may significantly shape how 
evil is construed.  Pure evil agency at face value seems like a strong counterexample to the 
internalist thesis because it suggests the existence of an agent that can judge or deem something 
to be morally good but in turn be motivated to do its contrary, evil.  In order to better understand 
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the inner workings of evil, this apparent discrepancy needs to be further clarified by motivation 
externalist counterexamples and coherently examined by motivation internalist accounts.  
 Rather than get buried in a mountain of unnecessary details, important though they may 
be, the primary aim here is to specifically concentrate on internalist accounts of evil and their 
respective externalist objections.  In other words, the point is not to undertake the daunting task of 
concluding whether moral judgments are necessarily motivating (or not), but rather to investigate 
internalist views of evil in light of the conceptualizations highlighted in sections 1.1 and 1.2.  On 
this metaethical level, pondering the relation between agent judgment and motivation could 
advance philosophers’ normative understanding of evil. 
 The following are just a few of the questions this inquiry will examine in the subsequent 
chapters: How does the motivational internalist explain purely evil agents, such as Milton’s 
Satan, who seem to acknowledge the good but are motivated to do the contrary?  How does 
motivation externalism compare with internalism?  That is, how do external factors influence 
agent motivation and/or judgment for both perverse and pure evil agency?  And lastly, what are 










 Before examining internalist and externalist reasoning, it would be helpful to establish 
suitable criteria or benchmarks that keep both theoretical positions at a fair starting point in the 
discussion.  While both theoretical camps work directly against the other, this inquiry will 
impartially mediate their strengths and weaknesses on a level playing field.  An argumentative 
point sometimes forwarded, which must be dispelled, is that the mere existence of amoral or 
akratic agents satisfies as proof against the internalist position.  In other words, the externalist is 
said to have a certain advantage over the internalist in terms of the burden of proof.
65
  It is 
tempting here to suggest the same about evil agents, thereby automatically putting internalism on 
the defensive “hot seat”.  
 While the externalist position can be described as the skeptical alternative to the 
internalist thesis, the reader should for the time being set aside the question of which position has 
the burden of proof.  Even if, as some externalists insist, internalism makes the positive claim,
66
 
one should not impose such strict conditions at the outset.  The motivation internalist should not 
need to comprehensively explain every possible counterexample in order for their explanatory 
model to be considered.  Similarly, externalists should not be expected to prove a negative and 
disprove every single aspect of an internalist account.  There needs to be realistic, yet 
challenging, objectives to fulfilling the task of explaining evil.  Additionally, there must be 
something that, if achieved, would be a reliable indication of a position’s success or advantage. 
 Any benchmark must begin by safeguarding this inquiry from falling prey to 
rationalizations that try to beg the question.  To use a popular example, it would be circular to 
argue from the premise that “The Bible is God’s word and everything in it is true” to the 
conclusion “Therefore, God exists” because the premise is assuming the truth of the conclusion 
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when it should be trying to demonstrate the conclusion.  If an internalist or externalist model of 
evil were to radically change the way in which our moral discourse reflects on the concept “evil”, 
then there should be good explanatory reasons to explain this discrepancy—absent of ad hoc 
reasoning.  Otherwise, it should be able to reasonably account for the reality of evil in life and in 
moral discourse.  This would very much include atypical agents, like Milton’s Satan, who 
seemingly comprises an entirely distinctive category of evil that was explored in section 1.2. 
 Whatever mechanics of evil proposed or moral psychology posited should address the 
reality of evil’s multifarious manifestations.  As section 1.1 outlined with some persuasive force, 
evil can have many faces and roots.  That is, there is more than one way to be evil and the details 
matter.  Both the internalist and externalist need to address or keep in mind the diversity of evil 
which pervades our moral discourse—from the poetic musings of Milton’s Paradise Lost, the 
literary creation of Claggart in Melville’s Billy Budd to the recent cinematic ambiguities of the 
Star War saga’s Anakin Skywalker and The Joker in Dark Knight (2008).  The following is a 
tentative outline of the core benchmarks that in later chapters will be explored in some 
instantiation of internalism: 
 B1 ‘Relevance to Moral Discourse’: The account should present substantive, 
positive, components that illustrate how evil operates within the context of agent 
judgment and motivation. 
 B2 ‘Explanatory Power’: The account should adequately explain the uses of “evil” in 
moral discourse without alienating ordinary intuitions about its meaning.  If it does 
run counter in some ways, then it should be able to explain these discrepancies and 
not resort to ad hoc tactics. 
 B3 ‘Consistency’: The account should address and reasonably give account of the 
conceptual distinction fit together with the initial chapter’s conceptual analysis and 
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psychological analysis of evil.  If the account is mistaken, then the account should 
suggest an answer as to the diversity and type of evil agency.  
These benchmarks will not be directly emphasized in this inquiry, but will provide direction for 
the issues at hand.  Exploring the motivation internalist and externalist debate will lend a better 




Exploring Motivation Internalism and Externalism 
 This chapter will be surveying the basic argumentative structures that drive the debate 
between motivation internalism and externalism.  At the same time, it will be suggested how each 
metaethical position conceptually accounts for evil.  There are many layers to the debate, 
however, that must be clarified.  The predominant focus among internalists and externalists in the 
philosophical literature centers on the amoral agent.  How the internalist and externalist 
commonly explain instances of amorality as well as akrasia (i.e. weakness of will) will be 
valuable to know for later reference.  When the evil agent is put into perspective within the 
context of internalism and externalism, there may be a general pattern of reasoning that one can 
identify alongside the amoral and akratic agent.  While amorality, akrasia, and purely evil agency 
are completely different conceptualizations, externalists will utilize each in similar ways as 
critical counterexamples to the MIT.  Similarly, internalists have a stockpile of ready-made 
answers for mostly every deviation from the motivational norm.  
 While part of this chapter will be devoted to making sense of internalist and externalist 
reasonings on these related matters, this inquiry is ultimately focused on how evil is understood in 
relation to agent judgment and motivation—specifically purely evil agency.  Andrew Sneddon, 
among other philosophers, will be cited in the attempt to demonstrate the sort of problems evil—
specifically purely evil agency—triggers in the debate.  Immanuel Kant’s internalist account of 
evil in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason will stand out as the most intriguing, if not the 
best suited, for providing an answer to the inner workings of the evil will.        
38 
Section 2.1 will explore amoral and akratic agency in terms of how it has shaped the 
debate between motivation internalists and externalists.  The MIT has been frequently modified 
as conceptual and empiricial information arises in moral discourse.  To illustrate the significant 
progress made by contemporary internalists, Plato’s model will be used to show critical problems 
with some internalist formulations regarding how rationality is understood with theories of what 
is good.  Plato’s assumptions about evil agency are not beyond question and have, to some extent, 
been discarded by modern-day internalists.  In section 2.2, the discussion will turn to how the 
conceptualizations of evil previously outlined in the first chapter can influence the debate.  The 
purely evil agent can be presented as an additional counterexample for externalists to use against 
the MIT and some internalist answers will struggle making sense of purely evil agency.  After 
assessing how evil agency fares alongside other (amoral and akratic) counterexamples, section 
2.3 will focus on introducing the Kantian model.  Immanuel Kant’s account of evil evades some 
critical problems that will be discussed in this chapter but at the cost of rejecting the possibility of 
pure evil for human beings.
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2.1 Amorality and Akrasia  
 In moral discourse, it is a common notion that people’s conduct or actions are to some 
extent guided by their moral judgments.  Moreover, judgments are generally construed as 
expressions of belief—the things that individuals and groups identify with.  The debate between 
motivation internalism and externalism explores whether moral judgments themselves have 
motivational efficacy or the source of motivation is largely external to moral judgments.  That is, 
the issue involves the degree and the extent by which motivation enters into judgment once it is 
consciously and intentionally uttered by a person (or agent).  While there are differences between 
internalists and externalists within their own theoretical positions, there are core elements that 
distinguish both.   
 Motivation internalists generally posit that there is a necessary and a priori connection 
between believing or judging X is good and the motivation to X.  Externalists, on the other hand, 
argue that the connection between our judgments and motivation is—at best—contingent due to 
certain counterexamples refuting the internalist picture of motivation.  On their view, it is 
possible to sincerely express moral beliefs and not be motivated to act on them.  Much of the 
debate in this regard has typically focused on externalist counterexamples of amoral agency and 
akrasia.  This section will briefly summarize the progression of this debate in preparation for a 
new set of counterexamples involving evil agency. 
 When a moral agent has the belief that “Being kind is a morally good thing to do” and 
makes a judgment based on this belief in particular circumstances, one generally expects that this 
judgment will cause the agent to act on it or to some extent be action-guiding.  Beliefs are 
supposed to inform agents how to live by demarcating (what the person deems) right from wrong 
or good from evil.  In what sense then can one have a belief or judgment about something but not 
be motivated or compelled to act on it?  Suppose someone recognized the moral legitimacy of the 
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previous judgment about kindness.  It would be strange if that person then turned around and 
acted rudely to others with deliberate impudence.  One might think the agent misunderstood what 
he/she was saying or perhaps the agent temporarily lost his/her faculties (via a mental disorder or 
a traumatic situation that could explain such seemingly erratic behavior).  An internalist might 
say—among other things—that the agent did not sincerely have the belief to form the judgment in 
the first place.  This seems to suggest that belief must be what William James labels a “live 
hypothesis” and not some lifeless proposition.
67
  For an agent to form a judgment, and do so 
sincerely, there must be some internal appeal; believing in something means having some 
“willingness to act at all” in that manner.
68
   
 An externalist, on the other hand, would insist that it is not altogether strange for agents 
to express beliefs or make judgments and not have any motivation towards implement or acting 
on them.  Recognizing that there are agents suffering from “weakness of will” (i.e. akrasia) is one 
way to illustrate how motivation is perhaps not completely internal to judgments themselves.  It is 
a case where the agent fails to carry out judgment into demonstrable action because of some 
overriding influence.  Thus the question of whether an agent must judge and be motivated by a 
judgment (e.g. “Being kind is the morally good thing to do”) when the occasion calls for doing it, 
remains open to externalist scrutiny.
69
   
 Nevertheless, externalists attempt to utilize counterexamples of agents that have deviant 
motivational compasses but also have the wherewithal to come to the same conclusions as 
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ordinary moral practitioners about kindness and other moral judgments.  Some of these agents 
may show symptoms of akrasia or be radically amoral in that they are unaffected by the 
motivational force of their own moral judgments.  The recent cinematic portrayal of the Joker in 
The Dark Knight (2008) represents an, albeit extreme, amoral agent with a powerful intelligence 
and dedication to anarchy.  He seems quite aware of society’s rules and morality itself, but 
disregards them willfully.  Not all amoral agents fall into this particular lifestyle.  Other 
noticeably amoral agents can have little to no impulse towards criminality—like hermits, 
recluses, or vagabonds.  At the very least, amorality involves a motivational inertness but not at 
the expense of diminishing a person’s knowledge of the matter.  Such a person can express a 
judgment very sincerely but simply does not have the relevant motivation to act on it.   
While amoral agents withdraw from moral concerns or questions, they can still possess 
moral knowledge in the same way one can possess knowledge about proper dinner etiquette.  
There are two ways in particular that these conditions tend to arise.  The agent was raised and 
instructed in moral discourse from childhood but, similar to how some people lose faith in their 
religious tradition during adult years, the agent later rejects those norms.  Or the agent could have 
been raised with a great understanding of morality but just never really cared about being a moral 
person as deemed by social norms.  The former can represent nihilists, certain deviant criminals, 
and perhaps misanthropic hermits; the latter seems to fit the serial killer paradigm addressed 
earlier in section 1.1.   
An example might make this externalist criticism clearer.  Suppose a man is attending the 
figure skating competitions during the next Winter Olympics at the behest of his mother.  She is 
an avid fan of the sport and has immersed him in the practices of professional figure skating as if 




 by which one can judge the different kinds of skating maneuvers and the quality of 
their execution.  But while her son never really had the slightest motivational investment in 
skating, he nonetheless learned the parameters of the sport.  He knows what certain terms mean 
and correctly applies them to various skating activities.  As a result, the man is in a similar 
position to the amoral agent.  He has extensive knowledge of a particular discourse and the 
capacity to form normative judgments according to the standards of this discourse, but—unlike 
his mother— he is not moved in any motivational sense by his judgments.  
At the upcoming Olympic skating competitions, imagine that the man observes one 
particular skating performance and, based on the established rules of the sport, states that “The 
skater poorly executed that triple lutz jump.”  His mother chimes in and forms the normative 
judgment that “The judges should penalize the skater for switching to the inside edge on that lutz 
jump.”  The man affirms this judgment
71
 but the mere affirmation of this normative judgment 
does not seem to be enough to infer the necessity of his motivation to act on it.  One could object 
along the same lines as the internalist’s sincerity qualification outlined earlier and suggest that 
this person is situated as a passive observer and less of a basis to think that their judgments are 
legitimate.  In other words, his judgment fails to be expressed sincerely to count as action-
guiding.  This would, once again, take the issue back to the question in section 1.2 of whether an 
                                                          
70
 See the section on “The Standards of Evaluation” in J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 25-27. In that section, Mackie describes how one can take normative 
standards as action-guiding but at the same time deny the objectivity of said standards as it relates to 
moral realism.  The standard of, say, grading apples in the food industry is non-arbitrary because there are 
reasons that drive the standard one way versus another.  But Mackie argues that “something may be 
called good simply in so far as it satisfies or is such as to satisfy a certain desire; but the objectivity of such 
relations of satisfaction does not constitute in our sense an objective value.”  
71
 The affirmation of the judgment can be made by just reflecting on what one knows factually about the 
sport: If it is the case that switching to the inside edge on a lutz jump in the figure skating world is deemed 
a poor execution by the skater, then based on those measures of judging in the discourse of professional 
skating, the skater ought or should receive a penalty to his/her overall score. Though the “ought” in this 
judgment is not properly moral, the context by which the agent above is motivationally detached from his 
judgments about professional skating is not that dissimilar to an amoral agent like the Joker who 
presumably has moral knowledge of right and wrong within a societal context.  The difference, though, 
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agent’s affirmation of X necessarily imbues the evaluation of X as normatively good or desirable.  
While Elizabeth Anscombe and David McNaughton both support this position, especially when 
considering the dynamics of John Milton’s Satan in Paradise Lost, there were good reasons given 
for being skeptical of this view.               
But consider the following amendment to the example above: Suppose the man happened 
to also be a judge in the competition.  His motivational apathy was (mis)perceived by others as a 
rigid impartiality—a quality that is desired of referees in any sport.  Similar to the situation 
above, he affirms the judgment that a penalty is appropriate after the skater’s performance.  Does 
the internalist’s insincerity objection still apply?  The man is no longer a passive observer in the 
stands but integrally involved in situation.  An externalist may contend that it would be an open 
question whether his judgment was internally motivating or some other external factor influenced 
him to act on the judgment.  The man’s love for his mother or perhaps fear of the repercussions 
for nonconformity could be just as much a candidate for the source of his motivation rather than 
the judgment by itself.  Does it necessarily follow that judgments provide an agent with the 
motivation to want to act in that way?  The situation above seems to indicate the opposite, that 
motivation is not necessarily contained within the power of judgment, but that agent motivation 
can perhaps entirely depend upon some source external of a judgment. 
 In the realm of moral judgments, the motivation externalist is making a similar point.  
The amoral agent’s disposition towards moral discourse is such that one has knowledge of right 
and wrong in an intellectual sense and is not moved by it.  Unlike being conversant about 
professional figure skating, people utilize and appeal to moral language all the time.  An amoral 
agent, unconcerned with questions of morality, comes into contact with moral language 




  There is hardly any escaping the moral assertions of others, even for amoral 
agents.  So, it is not far-fetched—but actually quite plausible—for an amoral agent to score well 
on a moral competence or aptitude test.  Ordinary moral agents, however, do not merely employ 
judgments but they actively immerse themselves in morality.  The relation the mother has to 
professional figure skating is comparable to what moral practitioners generally have to moral 
discourse.  They see themselves as moral agents and take their judgments seriously as action-
guiding.  This is not the case with how externalists depict the inner life of amoral agents. 
 To use Searle’s terminology from his 1964 article “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is,’ ” 
there is an internal and external context to judgments involving “institutions.”
73
  The judgment 
“One ought to keep one’s promises” is only relevant to agents who have opted—or have the 
desire to opt—into the moral institution of promise-keeping.  Most agents normally participate in 
morality or have the desire to contribute to moral discourse.  From their perspectives within the 
institution, to ask “Ought one to keep one’s promises?” would rightly be an empty question.
74
  
The amoral agent, though, does not opt into this institution.  Additionally, the agent is not 
internally motivated by the judgments made in moral discourse.  This does not mean that amoral 
agents are ignorant about what moral judgments involve.  They may know the intricacies of moral 
discourse better than some of the actual participants.  While amoral agents are capable of 
mimicking moral judgments when they do not sincerely believe them to be true, it is open to 
debate whether this is attributable to amorality altogether or just particular instances of it.  Unless 
amorality can be fundamentally linked with insincerity, it is difficult to conclude whether the 
judgments of amoral agents are what they really believe or judge to be the case. 
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 There is a wealth of philosophical literature with reference to internalist and externalist 
debate on amoral agency.
75
  The metaethical stances of both sides have far reaching implications 
that can enter into other areas such as epistemology and philosophy of mind (e.g. inquiries like 
“what is a belief?” or “what does it mean to believe something?”).  To adequately explore every 
aspect of agent judgment and motivation would be too big a burden for this inquiry to handle.  So 
the overall aim here is to focus on the objections most relevant to amorality and then later focus 
on evil—with a special emphasis on purely evil.  Keeping with the benchmarks established in 
section 1.4, one should expect that internalism has explanations available to the alleged 
counterexamples above regularly offered by externalists or those sympathetic to a position 
contrary to internalism.   
 The most common internalist response to instances of amorality is to question whether or 
not such agents sincerely believe what they presumably judge (or knowingly affirmed) to be the 
moral rule.  Similar to Ancombe’s interpretation of Milton’s Satan in section 1.2, such agents 
could merely be mimicking the normative evaluations of others in an inverted-commas sense.  
Returning to the judgment that “Being kind is a morally good thing to do”, the amoral agent could 
really be saying “According to the moral standards of this community, being kind is a morally 
good thing to do”.  As such, judgment becomes a factual observation about other people’s beliefs 
and not an expression of the agent’s own beliefs.  The amoral agent, like an anthropologist, is an 
outside observer that has an intellectual comprehension of the subject in question at the same 
level as those who have embraced or opted in the discourse, but is not motivationally invested 
towards acting on the knowledge.  Similar to the ice skating example earlier an anthropologist can 
learn, take up the discourse, and by proxy be involved in the community.  But none of this would 
indicate that the anthropologist believes (at least in a sincere, honest, way) any of the propositions 
of the discourse.      
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 One could then interpret the externalist suggestions involving amoral agency as strange 
and simply untrue given that it is tantamount to the analogy that anthropologists, by becoming 
proficient in a particular discourse of a community, believe what they say in the same capacity as 
the practitioners themselves.  Obviously there are professional standards of impartiality and 
resistance to assimilation which anthropologists in the field are subject to follow; but this is not 
the case with amoral agents.  There is nothing inherent in moral discourse that obliges or compels 
such agents to demonstrate their beliefs or judgments.  As such, it appears to be a working 
assumption that amoral agents are disingenuous about the nature of their own beliefs or 
judgments.  On this point the anthropologist and the amoral agent both converge.  While the 
externalist may have a point in suggesting that knowledge of something does not equate to having 
the motivation to act on it, this fact does not immediately strike against the MIT as it is currently 
understood.  Internalists can preserve their account by couching amoral agents in terms of 
insincerity by not genuinely embracing a moral commitment to the discourse.  Their expressed 
judgments have no inkling of intention and, thus, are nothing but a string of words that merely 
echo moral judgments found in discourse.        
While all internalist accounts have access to this objection of amoral counterexamples, 
there are different accounts within motivation internalism and externalism that not only explain 
the relation between our thoughts and motivations but also touch upon moral psychology (e.g. 
good, evil, amoral agency).  As much as motivation internalists draw on the standard reading of 
the MIT outlined in section 1.3, their accounts can vary depending on the degree or extent to 
which motivation enters into agent judgment.  Some traditional or classical internalist models are 
rightfully dismissed by contemporary internalists because they easily fall victim to externalist 
counterexamples utilizing specific cases of amorality and/or akrasia.   
 One example is Platonic or Socratic internalism as it is conveyed by the paradox of the 
good in the dialogue Meno (among others).  This paradox can be construed into two different 
47 
kinds: the moral and the prudential paradox of the good.  The prudential paradox states that “all 
men desire good things” where good means “beneficial” or, inversely, those who pursue harmful 
things do so involuntarily.
76
  The moral paradox is expressed later in the dialogue by Socrates’ 
definition—virtue is knowledge—suggesting that all injustice or wrongdoing is done in 
ignorance.
77
  While there is debate between scholars whether these two versions are independent 
or can be lumped together into one account, the implications of both paradoxes can impact the 
way internalism is formulated.        
 Regardless of any differences between the two, both versions of the paradox appear to 
deny the moral phenomenon of akrasia (i.e. weakness of will).  The paradox of the good implies 
that no one would fail to be motivated towards the good if they had knowledge of the good.  On a 
larger scale, it is part of a larger position known as psychological eudaimonism (PE).  Rebecca 
Bensen-Cain, in Socratic Method, suggests that the paradox of the good—as it relates to PE—is 
something Socrates promotes as “true regardless of what the interlocutor claims to be the case 
because it belongs to human nature.”
78
  She defines psychological eudaimonism as the view that 
“all humans, by nature, desire the good where ‘good’ is understood as happiness or what 
conduces to happiness.”
79
  If virtue is knowledge, then any moral failure (including akrasia) is 
due to some underlying ignorance of the agent.   
This rationale would also explain amoral agents in terms of insincerity, dishonesty, or 
perhaps even self-deception.  Judgments from an amoral agent are not meaningfully expressed 
because there is a fundamental disconnect between one’s desire for the good and belief of what is 
good.  Thus, amorality is a product of ignorance in the sense that an agent’s knowledge of the 
good would necessarily provoke the requisite action.  Since amoral agents are defined as not 
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being necessarily motivated by their moral judgments, then for Socrates they must not have 
knowledge of the good.  If only amoral agents knew better in terms of acting on knowledge of the 
good, then they would be properly motivated to act.  
 This internalist model of moral motivation is flawed for several reasons.  The first 
problem with this view concerns the appeal to “facts” about the nature of human motivation in 
order to explain the normativity of moral judgment.  That is, as Bensen-Cain pointed out earlier, 
Socrates assumes rather than argues for the truth of psychological eudaimonism and subsequently 
the paradox of the good.  Peter Railton suggests that the normative and motivational forces of 
morality do not seem so strictly bounded together—that perhaps externalists can better provide an 
internal story of how moral judgments relate to one’s motivation to act.
80
  It is doubtful to assert 
that human nature as a matter of fact is disposed towards the good.  If one understood “good” as 
tautologically identical with whatever an agent regards as beneficial or desirable, then the 
Socratic internalist may have a case.  But, as explored in section 1.2, one would be committing a 
hasty generalization and may omit certain irregular cases of moral agency (e.g. purely evil 
agency).       
Socrates seems to suggest a psychological necessity between rational agency and human 
nature such that having knowledge of the good guarantees one will act in that manner.  Just as the 
statement “All bachelors are unmarried men” embodies a strict conceptual definition between 
terms, the paradox of the good regards one’s object of desire as a perceived or otherwise closeted 
good.  The idea being expressed here can be reduced to the following: motivation is not and can 
never be inert whenever an agent consciously and correctly acknowledges what is good (and 
bad).  
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 This leads to the second and most obvious of problems with the Socratic view.  
Motivation can sometimes fail us, despite sincerely judging that a certain action is morally 
required.  Also known as incontinence or akrasia, weakness of will is a moral problem that occurs 
when an overriding factor such as desire or some other conflicting circumstance generates 
inaction or hesitancy.  In the dialogues Protagoras and Republic, Plato’s Socrates addressed the 
potential impact that pleasure or desire can have on the one’s rational deliberation.  The case of 
Leontius’ (sexual) “appetite” to look at corpses and his simultaneous revulsion towards this desire 
is remarked on in Bk.4 of the Republic.
81
  This seems to indicate that Plato was at least aware of 
the potential overriding nature of competing desires.   
But, for Plato, there is a notion that an agent is ignorant if desire can easily overturn one’s 
knowledge—that the person did not really “know” in the first place.  A person’s correct 
knowledge of the good and regard for reason cannot be corrupted or overwhelmed by any desire 
no matter the circumstances.  If such desires were to determine one’s actions, then Leontius is 
nonetheless ignorant of what he knows or knew to be good.  As such, Socrates’ rather simplistic 
view of agency is that a person’s actions ultimately demonstrate whether he/she has knowledge of 
the good or not.  Amorality and akrasia are each the result of the agent’s ignorance.  The amoral 
agent not only fails to sincerely connected with their expressed moral judgments, but the agent 
also fails to even have knowledge of right and wrong in the first place.  Similarly if akratic agents 
fail to act according to what they deem good, then the agents must not have really known.  This 
internalist view is rightly disputed as it establishes an unwarranted guarantee that an agent’s 
judgment will always succeed to motivate the action which adheres to the judgment.  This 
internalist model of moral motivation comes off too strong in the determining power of 
motivation on pronounced judgment. 
                                                          
81
 Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A Grube (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1992), 115-116 [440-
440b]. 
50 
 To see where Socratic internalism may have gone wrong, one should re-examine the 
intellectualist
82
 views of Plato’s Socrates: PE and the paradox of the good.  In terms of the city-
soul analogy
83
 which Plato outlined in detail throughout the Republic, there are several different 
motivational forces that pervade human nature.  The rational nature of intellect, the spirited nature 
of emotions, and the appetitive nature of desires are things that can be found within every human 
being.
84
  Socrates champions reason as the primary faculty that should rule the human being.  
Reason is superior to desire and should moderate its influence in everyday life.  But the other two 
faculties, emotion and desire, often go hand in hand and do not aid the intellect’s rational 
deliberations of good and bad.  In fact, in the dialogue Phaedo, Socrates believes that to be a 
philosopher is to separate oneself from the attachments of the body—among them its emotional 
and appetitive urges.
85
  Desires can impede even the most educated person.  In these moments, 
ignorance (via emotion or desire) clouds one’s reason and the “multiform beast….weaken[s] the 
human being within”.
86
   
 The problem with Socratic internalism is the resultant view that if one truly had 
knowledge of the good, then one could not fail to act according to this knowledge.  A human 
being’s willpower that is aligned with reason and therefore with knowledge of what is good 
simply would not act otherwise.  This seems to defy the reality of moral motivation as seen 
throughout moral discourse.  People struggle all the time to act on what they believe to be good.  
Aristotle also echoes this concern about Socrates’ rejection of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics:   
   “[F]or it would be strange—so Socrates thought—if when knowledge was in a 
man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave. For Socrates 
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was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing 
as [akrasia]; no one, he said, when he judges acts against what he judges best—




The “observed facts” in this case are the innumerable ethical situations in everyday life that 
can test one’s resolve.  Why does any agent sometimes hesitate with a decision, struggle with 
what he/she knows to be the morally right thing to do, or perhaps even behave/act contrary to 
their pronounced judgments?  Genuine situations in ordinary life that follow these parameters 
can be easily identified.  Common situational themes involve emotional influences such as 
addiction, infatuation, and perhaps even depression.  For example most smokers today know 
the damaging effects of nicotine but are enthralled by its addictive influence.  In cases of 
infatuation, an individual can be captivated by a damaging attraction towards some particular 
object of obsession to the extent that it diminishes other moral and non-moral concerns.  With 
depression, it is not difficult to imagine a grieving widow struggling to fully maintain the 
motivating power of her moral beliefs (e.g. giving to charity, helping one’s neighbor, etc) 
while in the grips of listlessness.   
 Competing motivations in these situations weaken their (moral) resolve and prevent 
the motivating power of judgments from coming to fruition.  Either due to some competing 
motivation or motivation-sapping emotional influence, the smoker, the infatuated individual 
and grieving widow have their better motivational inclinations overridden and determined by 
a stronger influence that they cannot resist.  This does not mean that these agents are 
unequivocally in a state of ignorance, but rather that the agent’s self-knowledge of what is 
good was not strong enough to overcome other rival influences.   
 In addition to the above overriding conditions involving emotion, there are times 
when a situation can produce a clash between significant ethical values which may result in a 
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kind of motivational paralysis.  Such ethical dilemmas are generally a staple of any 
introductory ethics course in philosophy.  One well-known example is Bernard Williams’ Jim 
and Indians scenario that involves someone having to choose between killing a random 
person in order to save a large group of people or refusing and, as a result, having to watch 
helplessly as the whole group gets massacred.  Williams points out that utilitarianism arrives 
at a seemingly obvious answer—to maximize the greatest good for the greatest number and 
save the group at the expense of one person—but fails to consider the cost of one’s own 
personal feelings and/or integrity.
88
  At times the morally right thing to do can not only be 
hard to perform, but can also come at a steep cost.  A person’s beliefs or personal judgments 
about killing do not relapse into a state of ignorance—as the Socratic internalist model seems 
to suggest—but rather the dire conditions of the situation overwhelm or override those 
concerns.  Lack of (sufficient) concern for moral goodness, rather than a lack of moral 
understanding or knowledge, is the real problem here.  
 Akratic agents seem to know or judge X genuinely but lack the will to act on X due 
to some psychological hindrance.  That is, on the level of forming moral judgments, the 
akratic agent correctly judges X but is obstructed by other factors.  At face value, without 
some qualified revision(s) to the contrary, the Socratic internalist model suggests that akrasia 
is incoherent.  But if moral failure can be genuinely caused by competing motivations (e.g. 
addiction, severe depression, etc), then this view is not adequately representing the judgment-
motivation structure of human beings.  If, as Stocker suggests, “the interrelations between 
motivation and evaluation are [both] various and complex”
89
 then there must be more to 
human motivation than simply the state of possessing knowledge of what is good.    
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 This problem, though, seems to be unique to internalist formulations such as Plato’s 
Socrates’ intellectualism.  Most internalists—and externalists for that matter—do not think 
that being motivated to do X necessarily guarantees X will happen.  There is always the 
chance, as explained above, that a competing motivation or desire can override the normative 
force of a moral judgment and cause the agent to act in some other way.  The pull of passion 
can oftentimes get the best of people’s sincere judgments.  By adopting broader versions of 
the MIT that allow for competing motivations to override an agent’s better judgment, 
contemporary internalists can easily avoid the bulk of this criticism (when Socratic 
internalism cannot). 
 Externalists in the debate have the advantage of a very simple and comfortable 
position.  In section 1.4, motivation externalism was referred to as merely the “skeptical 
negation” of the MIT.  By not adhering to the necessity of an internal motivating element 
within judgment, externalists simply accept that the motivating reasons of certain agents can 
sometimes wildly deviate from their expressed judgments.  The existence of amorality and 
akrasia is not problematic for the externalist.
90
   
The internalist, however, does have the weight of initial plausibility on its side when 
gauging immediate intuitions about the matter.  There is a general behavioral expectation that 
one’s motivations to act are, ceteris paribus, causally linked to one’s judgments.  It would be 
odd, as mentioned previously, for one’s mental faculties to reason and deliberate on some 
matter and then come to find one’s motivational leanings are entirely removed from those 
thoughts.  What would be the point of agent judgment in the first place if not to pinpoint 
one’s motivational leanings?   
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These facets of an agent’s will need not fundamentally conflict.  The internalist and 
externalist can likely trivially agree about most “normal” cases adhering to Figure 1 outlined 
in section 1.3.  As Peter Railton poignantly remarks, “every sane judgment-externalist will 
allow that moral judgments are so regularly accompanied by some sort of corresponding pro-
attitude that we almost always feel that a special explanation is needed when someone who 
has made a seemingly sincere moral judgment appears entirely indifferent…”
91
  Ultimately, 
what is being contested is the necessary and a priori relation between agent judgment and 
motivation—the core of the MIT.  In other words, the concern is whether there are loopholes 
(i.e. counterexamples) in either metaethical reasoning and, if so, whether these cases can be 
reconciled in the same way contemporary internalists have moved past the Socratic 
understanding of moral motivation.       
 Supposing that Figure 1 in section 1.3 is the default framework of an agent’s thought 
process, it does not directly confirm the MIT.  Externalists only need a solid counterexample 
in order to defeat the necessary and a priori condition that judgments contain within 
themselves sufficient motivational force for an agent to want to act on it.  If certain agents 
can genuinely approve of moral judgments and not be motivated to act on them, then an 
agent’s judgment and motivation is at best only contingent; and as a result the MIT in its 
general form is flatly false—even if it turns out that only one particular sort of agency does 
not coincide with the internalist framework.  Externalist tactics generally focus on critiquing 
internalism in this capacity because moral phenomenon like amorality and akrasia frequently 
occur in moral discourse.  And what people observe of moral behavior in terms of 
pronounced judgments and their overall effect on motivation is sometimes contrary to a 
particular metaethical rule—in this case the MIT.    
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While one can view motivation externalism as a skeptical or negative hypothesis,
92
 one 
could also simply consider externalism as an attempt to identify alternative mindsets relating to 
judgment that deviate from the MIT in general.  Railton suggests this and further argues that 
motivation externalists themselves need to go internal, to supply alternative stories that draw a 
different parallel between moral judgment and motivation:  
“It seems to me that multiple ‘motivational sets’ could be consistent with sincere, 
full-fledged use of a normative kind term…As in natural kind language, so in 
normative kind language: correct use need not require a canonical idea or 
sentiment ‘in the head’…”
93
 (emphasis mine) 
When motivation externalists formulate counterexamples to the MIT, what they are doing is 
attempting to describe an agent that correctly forms and applies moral judgments but at the same 
time those judgments are not inherently motivating in the way internalists would generally 
consider them to be.  Externalists are taking the MIT, however it is presented, and investigating 
whether various conceptions of agency produce exceptions that do not quite adhere to this 
framework.  As Wittgenstein once noted, “In philosophy one feels forced to look at concepts in a 
certain way. What I do is suggest, or even invent, other ways to look at it.”
94
  Externalists are, in 
some sense, Wittgensteinian.  They are testing the parameters of internalism with possible 
counterexamples of agency that defy the metaethical rule.  Given certain agent mindsets or 
thought processes, motivation may not be proof of taking a judgment normatively or vice versa. 
 Railton’s sensible cad is someone who knows quite well the normative discourse of 
harassment and uses the term with the same normative force as other speakers, but he does 
not consider his judgments to be inherently motivating or action-guiding; in fact, he has no 
motivational impetus to act in any particular way despite his pronounced judgments 
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concerning the harassment of a fellow co-worker.
95
  An internalist may suggest that such 
agents must have something wrong with them (e.g. insincerity, ignorance, etc) if their 
judgments lack motivational efficacy.  But Railton does not think that Roger is simply 
roleplaying or mimicking his normative use of the term “harassment”.  Rather, he is using the 
shared meaning of the term without opting into the discourse himself (similar to the ice 
skating example described earlier).  As such, Railton suggests that Roger and other agents 
like him can follow a path of correct use that is “parasitical”
96
 on the shared meaning of a 
term within a community—those that constantly form judgments and appreciate their 
normative guidance first hand.  In other words, Roger is committed “to using a normative 
concept with its ordinary, literal, shared meaning for a variety of reasons” but he is not “of 
one mind” with others in the discourse.
97
  This example—as one may already notice—seems 
to relate in some ways to the free rider problem and its variations within ethics, social theory, 
political science, and economics.    
The internalist may take issue with the parasitical nature of Roger’s normative 
judgments, but as Railton is quick to point out “most of us stand in a similarly ‘parasitical’ 
relationship to the linguistic and scientific community when it comes to our use of proper 
names and natural kind concepts and terms, without involving the least insincerity or 
impropriety.”
98
  This puts the internalist in a tough dilemma.  One cannot convict Roger of 
insincerity with his normative use of the term “harassment” without also convicting all other 
language users for similar offenses.  If the internalist gives way to other paths of correct use 
that do not necessarily require motivation as proof of taking a concept normatively, then the 
necessary and a priori relation between judgment and motivation breaks down and the MIT 
weakens to the point that it becomes trivial.  As quoted earlier from Railton, “every sane 
                                                          
95
 Railton, “Internalism for Externalists,” 169-171. 
96
 Ibid., 177. 
97
 Ibid., 171. 
98
 Ibid., 177. 
57 
judgment-externalist will allow that moral judgments are so regularly accompanied by some 
sort of corresponding pro-attitude…”
99
  The flexibility of externalism to explain various 
accounts of agency is a strength that internalism sorely lacks in this matter.   
Given Railton’s descriptions of this case, Roger—a womanizer himself—understands 
the normative meaning of harassment but nonetheless correctly judges when others commit 
the offense.  He is accused by others of being insincere, that he is “one to talk”.  Far from it, 
Roger actually cares about the accuracy of his judgments and “seems to understand the 
concept of harassment better than a number of his co-workers.”
100
  One presumably may have 
other problems with Railton’s sensible cad, but the internalist cannot dismiss this agent’s 
judgments in the same way as the amoral or akratic agent.  Railton entertains the suggestion 
that Roger is employing a narrow, one-dimensional, normative use of harassment in which he 
escapes self-condemnation by exempting his own activities as not “textbook harassment.”
101
  
Putting aside normative disputes on the meaning of harassment, ultimately for internalists 
they cannot say that Roger’s lack of motivation is necessarily due to complications in his 
ability to judge the matter correctly or sincerely.  The problem lies with his motivational 
compass, which internalists have said must be oriented towards wanting to act a certain way 
when it does not seem to be the case.  Looking back at Figure 1 in section 1.3, Roger’s case 
challenges the transition from S1 to S2.  Perhaps Railton says this best in the following 
passage:  
“In practice, we ordinarily learn something about a person’s state of mind when 
she makes a forceful normative recommendation or condemnation…The same is 
true, however, about ordinary belief: assertions normally convey information 
about the speaker’s beliefs. But it would be an instance of Searle’s ‘speech-act 
fallacy’ to attribute to an expression as its primary meaning a function the term 
characteristically, but not always or essentially, serve. Grasp of the way that facts 
about the speaker’s state of mind are implicated by her judgment is evidently 
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important for understanding all that goes on in ordinary normative discussions 
and exchanges of factual opinions. But none of this suggests that her state of 
mind must be part of the content of what she says…”
102
 
The necessary and a priori relation between judgment and motivation is at the heart of the 
conflict here in Railton’s case and also within the motivation internalism/externalism debate 
overall.   
The example given by Railton above depicts an agent that does not quite fall into 
either amorality or akrasia, but rather stands as an in-between.  And for that reason 
internalists can struggle to fit such agency within the MIT.  Does the purely evil agent, who 
affirms evil as evil, also stand on its own conceptually?  In the next section, purely evil 
agency will be included as an additional challenge (i.e. counterexample) to the MIT.  Are 
internalists left without some flexibility of their own to explain agents that appear to be 
exceptions to the rule?   This is still an open question, but the introduction of Kant’s 
internalist model of moral motivation and subsequent account of evil in later sections may 
make headway towards answering it.  Similar to amorality and akrasia, the motivations that 
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2.2 Evil Agency 
 How do internalists explain the motivations of evil agents?  The conceptual and 
psychological treatment of evil in chapter one was the prelude to a larger scale analysis of 
motivation internalist and externalist accounts of evil.  In particular, there is a conception of pure 
evil agency that seems to turn the MIT on its head—more so than any imagined case of amoral 
agency examined in the previous section.  Just like how an amoral agent can score well on a 
moral competence or aptitude test and at the same time have such knowledge fail to be entirely 
motivating in practice, the purely evil agent has a strong intellectual grasp of morality but is 
motivated to do what is considered evil rather than good.  For purely evil agents, the judgment 
that “X is good” represents motivation to do the contrary.  As discussed in section 1.1, purely evil 
agency is a rarified case that hardly plays an actual role outside of the literary and cinematic 
realms.  Nevertheless, its rarity should not discount any explanation (or lack of understanding) on 
the conceptual and psychological level.  One should remain open to varied rationalizations of 
pure evil from the motivation internalist and externalist positions.                   
 To briefly summarize, the difference between perverse and purely evil agency comes 
down to whether one performs such acts instrumentally or intrinsically.  A perversely evil agent is 
a corrupted agent that performs actions with some particular end in mind other than for the act 
itself.  There is an agenda or overarching motive that fuels the agent’s drive to do evil acts.  
Hence, a perversely agent looks upon his/her actions instrumentally—as a means to an end.  
Wealth, power, self-righteousness are some (of presumably many) goals which cause one to 
commit evil acts as a means. 
60 
 Purely evil agents, on the other hand, operate within the same moral context as ordinary 
moral agents but have an inverted motivational attitude that is attracted to evil rather than good.
103
  
Section 1.2 addressed the intricacies of perverse and pure evil motivation, ultimately closing with 
the suggestion that purely evil agents do not operate under a twisted conception of good when 
embracing the label of “evil”.  Personalities like Adolf Hitler—though his actions were certainly 
monstrously evil—are unambiguously perversely evil.  Hitler did not commit genocide for the 
sake of genocide.  The act of genocide was not itself treasured as an end but as a means.  He did 
not bring destruction and death to millions for the sake of just doing it.  By contrast, St. 
Augustine of Hippo seems to describe the purely principled stance that embodies pure evil when 
recalling stealing pears as a child: 
“I stole something which I had in plenty and of much better quality. My desire 
was to enjoy not what I sought by stealing but merely the excitement of thieving 
and the doing of what was wrong…Even if we ate a few, nevertheless our 
pleasure lay in doing what was not allowed…I had no motive for my wickedness 
except wickedness itself. It was foul and I loved it.”
104
  
Augustine’s childhood theft mirrors in many ways the phenomenon of “thrill killing” that was 
briefly mentioned in section 1.1.  While purely evil agents may experience some form of 
instrumental pleasure from their actions, the pleasure or other benefits of the evil act are 
secondary to the primary motivation: to simply do it is reason enough.  Evil for evil’s sake 
requires a character with principle and resolve to the same degree as one who is “good for 
goodness sake.”   
 If this explanation is not enough, there is another contrast to be made between perverse 
and pure evil.  In the case of Milton’s Satan which is outlined in section 1.2, it seems that not all 
evil agents express their evil intentions under the same context.  When Satan uttered “Evil, be 
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thou my Good” in Paradise Lost, his understanding of good and evil is starkly different from 
many others that fall under the label “evil”.  As suggested in 1.2, Satan’s utterance can be 
interpreted as using a formal sense of “good” rather than an evaluative one.  These different 
functions reveal a conceptual divide among some instances of evil-doing.  Most, if not all, agents 
make extensive use of the terms “good” and “evil”; but perversely evil agents evoke those terms 
within a revised, twisted, moral framework of their own devising.  As such, they form moral 
judgments under a de re context—Latin for “of the thing”.  This sort of understanding picks out 
the particular thing which the terms are supposed to represent.  The perversely evil agent 
subsumes a particular thing or value (e.g. power, wealth, self-righteousness, etc.) under the label 
of “good” and, by doing so, operates under a twisted moral code in direct opposition to the initial 
use of the term.  Hitler’s vilification of the Jews as evil, for example, reoriented his moral value 
of good to the extent that genocide could be justified in his view.  In other words, the perversely 
evil agent does not value evil as evil but rather evil as power, evil as happiness, or some other 
perceived good.    
 A de re understanding associates the term “good” with a particular thing an agent 
identifies, which allowed Hitler to “justify” genocide in accordance with his twisted agenda.  The 
purely evil agent, though, does not redefine what is good or evil.  Rather, the agent works within 
ordinary moral discourse and chooses evil as it already stands.  This understanding operates under 
a de dicto context—Latin for “of the word”.  The purely evil agent relates to good and evil 
according to the meaning of the words themselves, whereas a perversely evil agent dictates good 
and evil according to whatever specified interest with which they identify.  The purely evil 
agent’s aims just happen to lead to the attainment of power, wealth, or some other “good” but the 
perversely evil agent aims for those things at the start.  Purely evil agents do not seek to justify 
themselves as good or right.  Doing evil is its own reward. 
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 As with amoral agency, there are various ways for an internalist to give account of evil.  
Plato’s Socrates explained ordinary (i.e. perverse) evil as a fundamental mistake of one’s 
knowledge of what is good.
105
  Evil is the result of ignorance.  Hitler presumably did not think his 
actions were bad.  He believed what he was doing was good or morally justifiable.  Thus, one 
could say in the Socratic vein that Hitler was blinded by an overall ignorance of the actual good.  
If he had known better, Hitler would have not done those horrific actions.  While ignorance can 
explain the motivational failure of some evil agents, there are other instances of evil that do not 
seem to fit Socrates’ rationale.    
 In section 2.1, it was suggested that Plato’s internalism seems to place too strong a 
guarantee on the success of an agent’s judgment for inducing a motivation to act.  It is likely that 
Plato’s Socrates would have also considered the concept of pure evil fundamentally incoherent 
given the assumptions of the Socratic paradox of the good.  Like some cases of amorality and 
akrasia, purely evil agents cannot be straightforwardly accused of ignorance because these agents 
by hypothesis speculatively know the difference between good and evil.  To complicate the 
matter further, purely evil agents are motivated to do evil because of the fact that they judge it to 
not be good.  This is presumably a contradictory notion for Plato’s Socrates, akin to the concept 
of a married bachelor or a four-sided triangle.   
 The explanation that pure evil is merely a closeted perverse evil was questioned in 
section 1.2.  If pure evil is conceptually plausible, then Plato’s Socrates (or any other internalist 
account of evil for that matter) cannot relegate the purely evil agent to a closet lover of what is 
good without consequence.  Plato, as evidenced in the Republic, recognized that the power of 
desire was irrational and needed to be controlled by the rational powers of human agency.  The 
desire to do evil for evil’s sake should be no different for Socrates; purely evil motivation is a 
mark of irrationality.  This internalist explanation of motivational failure is what Andrew 
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Sneddon refers to as “Rational Moral Judgment Internalism” or rational motivation internalism.
106
  
While Plato’s internalism fails for other reasons, there are many other internalist accounts of evil 
that follow a similar rationale.
107
  
 In lieu of the objections centered on Socratic internalism, contemporary internalists can 
simply claim instead that there is sufficient motivation in one’s judgment to want to be motivated 
to act given no contrary overriding influences.  Though the strength of the relation between 
motivation and judgment is not strictly binding, internalists can still maintain an agent’s sincere 
judgment that “X is good” and motivation to act on that judgment as necessarily internally 
connected—one simply must imply the other.  There is an additional explanatory model that 
internalists can co-opt with the rationality conditions above, which Sneddon refers to as 
“Psychological Moral Judgment Internalism.”
108
  This kind of account attributes motivational 
failure to agents due to immaturity, deficiency (in judgment), or mental illness.  The measurement 
here is in terms of psychological stability or “normalcy.”
109
  Akratic, amoral, and evil agents in 
general are ignorant by varying degrees of immaturity or psychological deficiency.  Inexperience 
or mental depravity (i.e. corruption) lends an agent to be deluded and wrongly choose what 
he/she judges good and bad.  The extent of this self-delusion is presumably rather extreme for the 
purely evil agent.  
 Psychological moral judgment internalists, however, are subject to externalist criticisms 
as well.  Whereas rational moral judgment internalists appeal to the irrationality of an agent in 
order to explain the disconnection between moral judgment and motivation, psychological moral 
judgment internalists appeal to mental discrepancies that cause agents to purposefully form bad 
                                                          
106
 Sneddon, “Alternative Motivation,” 43. 
107
 One example is Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem (1994) which utilizes a model of “ideal rational 
agency” to defend motivation internalism. 
108
 Sneddon, “Alternative Motivation,” 43. 
109
 Assuming that there are standard psychological markers for determining normal and aberrant 
behavior, evil agents can be construed as anomalous deviations resulting from psychological defect. 
However, this suggestion is not without potential objections.   
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judgments.  Both positions highlight the same overarching claim that the agent does not really 
make a sincere moral judgment, but explain it using different methods.    
 Psychologically, the internalist could argue that evil agents suffer from warped (or 
otherwise ineffective) upbringing via mental defect or abuse.  Aristotle, at the beginning of his 
Nicomachean Ethics, suggested that his ethical system will not profit a student if he/she were 
“inexperienced in the actions that occur in life” and lacked the proper development of 
character.
110
  In other words, moral knowledge is useless if the agent did not already develop a 
stable moral character on which to appreciate moral improvement.  If an agent, similar to the 
profiles of many serial killers, grew up amid abuse and negligent moral guidance then it is highly 
likely that any moral education in later years would not be profitable.   
But purely evil agents, as they have been construed in the previous chapter, are just as 
morally educated and situated to live a moral life as any ordinary agent.  Thus, like the 
irrationality objection above, any psychological rationalization of pure evil seems to miss the 
mark and instead picks out some perceived manifestation of perverse evil.  Samet-Porat uses the 
label of “preferential evil” to describe the type of mindset of those who do a morally wrong 
action because “[the agent] prefers some other end to the avoidance of moral wrongdoing.”
111
  
However, preferential evil is still a step away from pure evil because “the depravity is not a by-
product…of that state of affairs.”
112
  A purely evil agent does what is morally wrong precisely 
because he/she judges it to be the morally wrong action.    
 Purely evil agents are a rather daunting case for internalists to explain, even within both 
rational and psychological explanatory models of internalism.  This is because such agents seem 
to be different than other instantiations of evil; they are not twisted, ignorant, or clearly irrational 
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in the same way as perversely evil agents nor are they motivated by some other end than moral 
wrongdoing as are preferential evil-doers.  Further, purely evil agents do not seem to suffer any 
mental defects or immaturity other than choosing to be evil (if such a thing can be considered a 
defect).  There is no reason to think that the intellectual faculties of purely evil agents are less 
acute than their (morally) good counterparts.  Simply, the agent under seemingly normal 
conditions affirms what is bad or evil on principle.   
Lockie describes the internalist process of explaining this sort of evil as an instance of 
inverted internalism:
113
 a case where internalism is turned on its head through a negatively 
confirming instance.  Unlike the amoral agent who lacks any motivation at all towards moral 
judgments and the akratic agent who is temporarily separated from the influence of their 
judgments, the purely evil agent “has the cognitive ability to discriminate immorality correctly 
enough, yet is held to be dissociated from the normal response to that immorality by being 
attracted to evil in itself.”
114
  The moral judgments and motivations in this case are disassociated 
in that one can judge a thing good but not just be entirely unmoved by that evaluation.  The 
purely evil agent’s evaluative judgment produces the motivation to do the contrary.  It may be 
tempting for the internalist to reject this sort of agency out of hand as yet another mask of 
perverse evil.  But there are some that are hesitant to dismiss this conceptualization.  
 An externalist insists that the evil agent could rightly and sincerely judge what is good 
and not be otherwise motivated to act in the direction of their judgment.  By disassociating the 
necessary connection between expressing a moral judgment and being motivated to act on it, the 
externalist does not have difficulty with explaining abnormal types of agency (e.g. amoral, 
akratic, evil).  Whereas the internalist posits motivating power internal to the judgment itself, 
externalists do not readily place the agent’s motivating power to act within the confines of their 
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judgments.  That is, the judgment alone may be just one of several external factors that can bring 
about the motivation to act.  Many externalists suggest that a corresponding desire or sentiment is 
needed to accompany an evaluative judgment and that perhaps the sentiment, not the judgment, 
contains the motivating influence.
115
  The corresponding desire does not seem to be explicitly 
internal to the judgment but an external feature of the agent’s mental state and circumstances.  
Thus, as an alternative account to the internalist framework outlined in section 1.3, the motivation 
to act may not be necessarily tied to the normative qualities of agent judgment.   
Sentimentalism or moral sense theory reflects the view above that a moral belief or 
judgment is ultimately grounded in sentiment or emotion.
116
  Having knowledge of what is good 
does not contain motivating power, but rather it is one’s own individual makeup and emotional 
development that determines how moral judgments affect one’s conduct.  Even if the moral 
judgment is legitimate (i.e. sincere), it does not necessarily inspire an agent to want to act on it.  
Without the power of sentiment in human beings, moral judgments by themselves are inert.  As a 
result, the externalist can attribute to evil agents discernable knowledge of what is good; yet their 
motivations to some external sentiment makes that knowledge just a series of claims among many 
others.
117
   
Samet-Porat, however, accuses the externalist approach of being too simple and 
perpetuating a counter-intuitive psychology.
118
  If evil agents stand on the same epistemological 
and psychological footing as ordinary agents then externalism (at least when considering an 
externalist position that adopts a Humean sentimentalist understanding of moral motivation) 
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makes reason impotent and “devoid of any motivational efficacy.”
119
  While externalists may 
have a point in criticizing the rigidity of the necessary and a priori relation between agent 
judgment and motivation, they also need to avoid the conclusion that there is no relation 
altogether and agents are subject to mere motivational whim.   
In other words, as Samet-Porat’s objection above suggests, the externalist view gives too 
much latitude to evil agency to the extent that an agent’s motivations can be inclined towards evil 
(in itself) as much as it can be inclined towards the good.  Most people want their metaethical 
beliefs to complement their normative deliberations.  That is, an explanation of evil should also 
be an indictment of the underlying problem(s) of being evil.  While externalists have the 
advantage of an easier, more flexible view of moral motivation, they are in danger of 
undermining what Christine Korsgaard calls “the normative question”
120
—why should I be moral 
(in the first place)?  At bottom, externalists (at least those dependent upon the Humean theory of 
moral motivation) suggest that “no desire is contrary to reason… [thus] desiring what is bad qua 
bad is not irrational and therefore raises no special problem.”
121
  This is quite a claim for anyone 
in moral discourse to integrate into their normative ethical theorizing.  Due to this factor Samet-
Porat believes, contrary to Shafur-Landau’s view mentioned previously, that externalism has the 
burden to clearly refute the MIT.
122
                       
  As previously outlined in section 1.4, burden of proof is not the focus of this inquiry but 
rather how both positions in light of these accusations fortify their explanatory rationale on evil.  
Externalists need to maintain a balance between the rejection that judgments are necessarily 
internally motivating and lapsing into arbitrariness and no mitigated structure of motivation 
altogether.  For internalists, though, one motivating sentiment cannot be just as good as another or 
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else one would have to conclude that moral goodness is no less preferable than wickedness.  If it 
happens to be the case that agents can correctly (and sincerely) judge things to be the case and not 
have any motivation to want such things, then moral goodness is put on the same level—in terms 
of motivational preference(s)—as its contrary.  
The rationality and psychological conditions of internalist explanations also serve to 
critically exhibit the weaknesses of abnormal types of agency (e.g. amoral, akratic, evil).  The 
reason that those agents seem to be exceptions to the MIT is because of a certain failing or 
weakness within their judgment or capacity to be motivated.  As such, one may suggest that the 
fault lies not with the MIT but rather with the agent in question.  Amoral agents seem to correctly 
judge what is good but their sincerity is called into question.  After all, how can one possibly 
embrace a judgment and not feel any (motivating) incentive to act on it?  The judgment itself, for 
internalists, does not appear to be a genuine expression of the agent; it sounds like a moral 
judgment but there is no further indication that the agent “owns” the judgment except by speech 
alone.  For the internalist, this must and should be scrutinized.  Similarly, akratic agents are 
compromised by some overriding factor of emotion.  The motivation for these agents to want to 
act on their judgments is present, but something else has prevented the wanting from being 
actualized (e.g. depression, passion, trauma, etc.).  If Railton’s case above is able to penetrate the 
MIT, then internalists can simply relegate it as an isolated anomaly.  As Simon Blackburn once 
noted, “externalists can have individual cases, but internalism wins the war.”
123
 
Thus, there is an impasse between both metaethical positions and, like the theist and 
atheist debate in philosophy of religion, there seems to be no reconcilable conclusion in view—
just two views that necessarily excluded the other.  This disparity seems to also be the case when 
it comes to explaining evil.  Internalists and externalists take their accounts into polar opposite 
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directions.  The internalist view is inclined to construe the evil agent (depending on the case) as 
an outright ignoramus, a closet lover of the good, a socially or psychologically unstable misfit, a 
deceiving or self-deceiving free-rider, or simply as an irrational sensualist completely succumbed 
to selfish desires.  The externalist view, through the use of counterexamples, tries to establish a 
contingent relationship between the sincere expression of a judgment and its internally motivating 
qualities.  As such, externalists are attempting to secure other (external) sources of motivation for 
an agent’s judgment to make outlier cases involving amorality and purely evil agency more 
intelligible.  As Blackburn hinted above though, this already gives up part of the game to 
internalism.  One could go so far as to say that externalism itself is parasitical and depends upon 
internalism when it comes to giving an account of normal, everyday cases of moral judgment.  
Railton and presumably other externalists as well recognize the intuitive appeal that the MIT 
offers under normal circumstances.  
Returning to purely evil agency, internalists should be cognizant of one particular 
problem.  While rational and psychological parameters might describe and explain most evil-
doers, pure evil agency still appears to be an exception and rises above these rationalizations.  
The explanations that internalists generally attribute to amoral and akratic agencies do not 
translate well with purely evil agency.  Unlike perversely evil agents such as Star Wars’ Anakin 
Skywalker, purely evil agents are not psychologically compromised.  Nor are they ignorantly 
pursuing some twisted perceived good as Hitler or psycho-sociopathic criminal like Ted Bundy.  
There is a remarkable kind of self-awareness within the purely evil mindset.  Such acute 
reflection can take internalists by surprise because it is the agent’s knowledge of what is good and 
evil that is used against them.  Samet-Porat similarly points out that “[purely evil] individuals 
seem to cut through the internalist theory. They preserve the structure of practical rationality 
while inverting the direction of motivation, so that a course of action is attractive as a result of a 
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judgment that it is bad.”
124
  Regardless of any substantial weaknesses on the part of externalism, 
internalist must have some answer for this sort of agency. 
With some preliminary background of the debate between motivation internalists and 
externalists established as well as how both positions can begin to explain evil agency, the next 
section will take up this problem caused by purely evil agency and will be further explored in the 
third chapter of this inquiry.  Immanuel Kant’s internalism rejects the possibility of purely evil 
agency, at least in any human form.  This position will be outlined in section 2.3 and further 
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2.3 The Kantian Approach 
Examples involving amoral and akratic agency have dominated the debate between 
motivation internalism and externalism.  The previous sections have explored some of the 
strongest internalists explanations for these counterexamples.  But pure evil agency seems to 
rebuke all those explanations.  Some have attempted to associate pure evil as a sophisticated, 
perverse evil.  Others have rejected the conceptualization out of hand as impossible.  Immanuel 
Kant, in his seminal work Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (referred to henceforth as 
simply Religion), seems to embrace the latter approach when it comes to human agency.  Kant 
brings a whole new analysis of pure evil as humanly impossible that also fits comfortably with 
the MIT described earlier in section 1.3.  This section will give a brief outline of the basic 
foundations that compose Kant’s internalism.  Even though there are religious overtones in his 
work,
125
 this should not detract from the metaethical insights that Kant’s work can bring to this 
inquiry.
126
   
Immanuel Kant presents a rather sophisticated internalist explanation for evil.  With his 
deontological ethics firmly in the background, Kant approaches evil from the standpoint that 
morality is eminently rational.
127
  To be moral is to exercise one’s capacity as a rational being.  
For an agent to act contrary to morality, one makes a choice that is not supported by the power of 
reason alone.  Naturally, the greatest obstacle that interferes with the motivating power of 
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morality is the influence of sentiment (e.g. the desires or passions).  As a result human beings, as 
rational and sentimental beings, are constantly having their beliefs, judgments, choices, and 
ultimately actions torn between two motivational forces.  Kant’s framework for defending this 
view is based on largely a priori reasoning.  It is not enough to make observations or introspect on 
the process by which judgments are internally motivating.  Empirical analyses of moral 
judgments merely scratch the surface of the motivational depths of agency.  For Kant, one must 
examine the will and the process by which an agent cultivates their moral disposition underlying 
maxim formulation. 
Even though Kant defines the will as “a kind of causality belonging to living beings so 
far as they are rational,”
128
 the term is employed in the context of two distinct functions—Wille 
and Willkur.  Henry Allison, in Kant’s Theory of Freedom, outlines a careful analysis 
distinguishing the two senses of the term.
129
  “Wille” represents the legislative function(s) of the 
will—the capacity of an agent to reason practically and form maxims.  “Willkur”, on the other 
hand, represents the executive function(s) of the will—the capacity of the agent to choose 
maxims such that they conform (or fail to conform) to the moral law.  Both together constitute the 
foundations of Kant’s theory of freedom and subsequently his theory of moral motivation.     
The will, both legislatively and executively, is an important starting point and deviation 
from previous internalist positions because Kant places it as the motivational origin of one’s 
moral judgments.  Rather than purely from a state of knowledge (or lack thereof), agent 
motivation and ultimately one’s moral status as good or evil is situated in the will.  In Religion, 
Kant identifies the source of evil as heterogeneity within the human will—the “power of choice 
itself” to subjectively determine maxims that are contrary to the moral law.
130
  It serves as the 
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ground of the agent’s incentives to act in one way as opposed to another (i.e. respect for the moral 
law or indulgence in one’s desires).  Kantian literature credits Henry Allison dubbing this view 
“the Incorporation Thesis”.
131
  An agent’s adoption of a motivating incentive for action is to have 
it “incorporated” into their will.  Thus, by associating agent choice with what one 
(motivationally) prioritizes in action, Kant’s internalism fuses agent judgment with necessary or 
obligatory motivating force as a synthetic a priori truth.   
The Incorporation Thesis sets up the process by which a human will is either good or 
evil.  One’s actions are not properly evil; rather it is the principle being chosen and affirmed 
within the action that is the source of evil.  In other words, actions by themselves are not 
sufficiently able to indicate the moral status of the agent in question because circumstances 
(among other things) can make an action seem like something it is not.  Such theorizing is 
common, especially in consequentialist ethics.  But Kant regards this thinking as akin to 
anthropology; such “principles of mere experience” are inferior to the grounding of a pure 
morality based on the a priori concepts of pure reason.
132
  It is the rational capacity to choose “in 
which the agent must invest the moral incentive with motivating power” that indicates one’s 
moral status as a good or evil will.
133
  Thus, the agent must put one’s incentives toward particular 
maxims into the proper order of priority.  What the agent does in action is largely irrelevant to the 
constitution of that agent’s will.  In fact, how an agent acts in the first place is utterly dependent 
on what the agent gives priority to in their incentives.  
While there are specifics to Kant’s normative ethics in terms of the criteria maxims must 
meet in order to be considered properly moral (via the three formulations of the categorical 
imperative), Kant’s proposed decision procedure is itself utterly formulaic.  The categorical 
imperative outlines a thought process by which an agent can rationally determine maxims that 
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adhere to the moral law.  Metaethically, this represents the first order stage of agent deliberation.  
There is a second order stage required of the agent before the categorical imperative can be 
appropriately used.  One must be oriented towards having a good will and the incentives that 
support it.  That is, the agent must “take an interest in the good” and have their priorities directed 
towards a rational duty to respect the moral law.
134
  Pablo Muchnik calls this the “ultimate 
principle of maxim-selection” or meta-maxim, in Kant’s German Gesinnung (disposition).
135
  As 
such, the agent incorporates into their will whichever incentive primarily motivates.  By virtue of 
making a judgment, the agent had at some point prior to the judgment made a fundamental choice 
about which motivating incentives will take priority over others.     
Kant’s rigorism requires the moral status of agents to be interpreted in only two distinct 
ways, as either morally good or morally evil.  While experience may seem to support the 
contrary, there cannot be any ambiguity when it comes to the Gesinnung of an agent or else “all 
maxims run the risk of losing their determinateness and stability.”
136
  To be clear, there can be 
plenty of evidence that moral actions and perhaps much of normative theorizing in general cannot 
fully permit rigorism.  But, for Kant, this cannot extend to the basis of the agent’s principle of 
maxim-selection.  In this case it simply has to be one of two options.  Either an agent prioritizes 
the incentives of the moral law or some other inclination which Kant broadly refers to as “self-
love”.   
In Kant’s Religion, the primary distinction between having a good will or an evil will is 
based entirely on one’s Gesinnung in terms of one’s chosen order of priorities.  A good will 
possesses the motive to perform the moral law for itself—to act purely from a rational duty to 
respect the moral law.  On the other hand, the evil will chooses to prioritize inclinations generated 
by the principal of self-love.  Pablo Muchnik illustrates the difference as similar to Kant’s 
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distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives (as well as autonomy/heteronomy).  
The hypothetical imperative “If you want to be trusted by others, then you ought not to steal” is 
vastly different than the categorical imperative “You ought not to steal!”  To have a will that 
prioritizes the incentives of self-love is to ground one’s maxims on the condition of a desire.  The 
person’s choice to follow the former imperative rather than the latter situates their will on the 
determination of some other factor or circumstance.  As such, the agent has adopted the criterion 
of heteronomy instead of autonomy via the self-sustaining, rational principle in the moral law.     
Ultimately, for Kant, these commands fail to be morally substantive because “the 
conditional character…forces reason to look for further conditions to ground and justify them” 
culminating into an infinite regress.
137
  The problem is at the very roots of the agent’s Gesinnung.  
The incentives of self-love lack justification because “[t]hey require the agent to will something 
because something else is willed, giving the pathological interest dominance over the practical 
one.”
138
  The moral law, however, is unconditioned and satisfies reason’s demand to be 
acceptable for every rational being.
139
  None of this necessarily entails that the evil Gesinnung 
would perpetuate actions deemed purely or even perversely evil.  The person may or may not 
steal in this case or perhaps never at all.  Whether or not one can associate or demonstrate some 
evil action with agency is irrelevant to agent Gesinnung.  Regardless of how much an agent’s 
actions are morally praiseworthy (or not), the incorporation of self-love as one’s principle of 
maxim-selection is the source of evil.  By giving in to incentives not conducive to respecting the 
moral law, agents have put themselves in the position of committing evil actions.  Moral 
goodness and autonomy both seem to have an a priori connection which the incentives contrary to 
the moral law cannot access. 
                                                          
137






 Agent volition (i.e. free will) is an important aspect of Kant’s internalism when 
considering the relations between morality and the incentives of rationality and sensuality.  Kant 
identifies the human will as structurally heterogeneous which is to say that human volition is 
determined by both objective conditions (e.g. reason and incentive(s) of the moral law) and 
subjective conditions (e.g. passion and the incentives of self-love).  Humans have freedom 
beyond that of an animal’s habitual will or a divine, purely rational will.
140
  Rationality allows 
agents such as human beings the ability to act against entreating desires, despite their persistence, 
and similarly sensuality allows agents the free choice to not be determined by the dictates of 
reason.  Whereas (most) animals compulsively act on their desires, human beings—agents with a 
rational and sensuous nature—are not at the mercy of their desires or reason and can subjectively 
determine their own actions.  Neither reason nor the sensuous impulses determine the human will 
unless the individual deems it an incentive.    
It is important to note how autonomy relates to morality and particularly one’s standing 
as agents.  Kant’s conception of freedom does not equate to an unfounded lawlessness.  That is, 
freedom does not operate in a vacuum absent of any configuration.  A lawless free will would be 
an absurdity and counteracts the rational nature humans inherently possess.  Autonomy, like 
reason, must follow a structure in order to clearly and consistently make sense of free choice.  
Allison and other scholars refer to this critical insight as Kant’s “Reciprocity Thesis” since the 
claim here is that morality and freedom are reciprocal concepts.
141
  That is, one’s commitment to 
the moral law is an expression, one and the same, of autonomy: 
“Hence, freedom of will, although it is not the property of conforming to laws of 
nature, is not for this reason lawless: it must rather be a causality conforming to 
immutable laws though of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be self-
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contradictory…This is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and the 




Just as the requirements for morality arise from rational agency, Kant asserts a fundamental 
entailment between freedom and morality.  The heterogeneous nature of the human will allows 
for individuals the choice to prioritize incentives towards the cultivation of a good or evil 
Gesinnung.  And one’s Gesinnung can presumably change if the human will incorporates the 
opposite principle of maxim-selection.    
For Kant, all of these a priori steps are the basic building blocks of his internalist view.  It 
allows him to ascribe to all agents—to every human being—the propensity to evil by virtue of 
possessing a rational nature and at the same time sensuous impulses which can potentially 
overturn the incentive to respect (i.e. prioritize) the moral law.  One’s Gesinnung is the basis by 
which each agent has decided how they will select maxims that will be action-guiding.  An agent 
develops an evil Gesinnung when one incorporates the principle of self-love, which is simply to 
say that the agent is subjectively determining his/her maxims by incentives not solely or directly 
concerned with the moral law.  Yet human beings also have a predisposition towards the moral 




 Thus, rather than being a particular mindset or approach, evil seems to be a condition 
that all agents share as a burdensome requirement for the kind of freedom animal and divine 
entities could never obtain.  In Religion, Kant affirms that human beings—by virtue of their 
heteronomous nature—have a universal propensity to evil.  Furthermore, Kant strikes at the heart 
of what this inquiry is searching for by immediately stripping bare the physical appearance of evil 
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to its core feature(s).  This is precisely the approach needed to procure some answers about the 
inner workings of evil.  
 To begin, Kantian internalism establishes agent motivation through an a priori relation 
between the concepts of pure reason and human beings’ predisposition to the moral law.  As 
Allison explains, “…the mere consciousness of the law of itself produces something like a 
‘proattitude’ toward the law in the agent, which in turn constitutes the conative factor in action 
from duty.”
144
  If rationality and morality are intimately connected, the moral law has its own 
(sufficient) motivational power when an agent genuinely formulates moral judgments.  Naturally 
there are overriding considerations that can result when agents are seduced by the incentives of 
self-love over the moral law.
145
  But, as previously explained, the actions produced by self-love 
do not constitute what is principally evil; rather, the agent’s legislative will itself is evil for 
prioritizing actions on the basis of sensuality rather than rational duty to respect the moral law.  
Thus, an evil person is not evil according to what the person does in action but due to the kind of 
Gesinnung the person develops via their meta-maxim.   
 Similar to Plato’s intellectualist account, Kant approaches evil agency with the view that 
morality is inseparable from its rational core.  As such, evil must be to some extent a corruption 
or defect in human beings’ rational faculties.  In cases of perverse evil, agents are generally 
ensnared by the incentives associated with self-love and believe them to be good in some way.  
Their maxims are, at bottom, hypothetical imperatives that are conditioned by desires (or 
circumstances) and are not properly moral.  The passions are pathologically subversive to the 
categorical imperative’s decision procedure and often work in opposition to coerce agents away 
from maxims that adhere to the moral law.  Hitler, according to the parameters of Kant’s 
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internalism, would be evil in the sense that he based his moral judgments on considerations in 
direct opposition to the moral law.  His judgments were presumably rooted in incentives that were 
desirable to him rather than towards fulfilling the moral law.  From the normative standpoint, one 
could appeal to the categorical imperative which demands that maxim (i.e. judgment) formulation 
be regulated by considerations of universalizability, the ends rather than the means of conduct, 
and the autonomy of all other rational agents.  But metaethically, in terms of moral psychology, 
perversely evil agents have corrupted their principle of maxim-selection before even making a 
moral judgment or acting on it. 
The case of Anakin Skywalker, described earlier in section 1.1 as a peculiar example of 
perverse evil, can be interestingly construed from the Kantian approach.  When Anakin was first 
submitted as a candidate for the Jedi order, the Jedi council headed by Yoda had reservations 
about whether or not he could be safely trained.  The Jedi analysis offered by Yoda in The 
Phantom Menace (1999) is not that different from the Kantian interpretation of (perverse) evil.  
The Jedi, according to Yoda, “must have the deepest commitment, the most serious mind” and as 
such require the proper control (i.e. prioritization) of one’s appetites and emotions in relation to 
one’s reason.
146
  The life of a Jedi, like that of an ascetic monk, requires strength of character and 
reverence for one’s duty to good principles.  Given the extraordinary powers one obtains being 
trained to use the Force, there are dire consequences when one adopts a principle of maxim-
selection that is not conducive to a rational duty for duty’s sake.  If one’s maxims are established 
on the basis of self-love, then it is not too difficult for maxims to deviate from the categorical 
imperative due to the moral law’s de-prioritization.  Kant, like the Jedi, acknowledges the power 
of sentiment in our daily lives and choices.  Having feelings by themselves is not dangerous; 
rather it is when the passions serve as the moral ground of actions that makes them dangerous.  
One could interpret the Jedi mindset as one that has the fortitude to repel the incentives of self-
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love and choose a life of duty and compassion, whereas the Sith reveling in power and passion 
opt for self-love.   
Given this conceptual framework, Kant does not encounter the problems that seemingly 
plagued Socrates and other similar internalist accounts in section 2.1 and 2.2.  Kant’s internalism, 
instead of pointing to the actions themselves, designates Hitler’s will (via the Incorporation 
thesis) as evil.  Genocide, greed, and maliciousness are things that are made possible by adopting 
a kind of mindset that would find those things motivating in the first place.  While Hitler’s actions 
are not indicative of an evil will, for one can have an evil will and have actions legally comply 
with the moral law,
147
 the motivating influence of his desires over and above any properly 
rational consideration makes it possible for the incentives of self-love to be subjectively chosen 
and notably evil actions can arise given the right conditions.  Pablo Muchnik points out that the 
evil Gesinnung essentially underlies one’s maxims with the subjective determination that “I will 
what I please.”
148
  Failure to prioritize the moral law can be explained in ways that have already 
been addressed previously: perhaps due to complete ignorance (e.g. idiocy or imprudence), 
overriding desires (e.g. obsession/mania), or some other circumstance (e.g. upbringing or 
education).  The label of self-love, for Kant, is merely a general principal of maxim-selection and 
can cover a wide variety of phenomena.  This may explain Hitler’s case and certainty many 
others, but what about pure evil? 
 Concerning purely evil agency, Kant—in some ways similar to Anscombe and 
McNaughton’s assessment of Milton’s Satan in section 1.2—rejects the conceptualization of evil 
qua evil motivation.  It represents a “corruption of [one’s] morally legislative reason” which is 
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inapplicable to human beings.
149
  While perversely evil agents succumb to the dictates of self-
love and reverse their order of incentives to reflect this priority, purely evil agents operate on a 
malignant reason opposed to the moral law in which it is completely renounced.  This thoroughly 
evil will affirms the meta-maxim of self-love but goes much farther than merely “I will what I 
please”.  In effect, the purely evil agent immediately rejects the moral law for what it is and then 
inverts the motivational power of the moral law as the basis to commit evil.  In other words, the 
agent does not choose evil qua some perceived good or desire via “the incentives of self-love” but 
rather opts to do evil because of the fact that it is contrary to the moral law.  The difference here 
is a crucial one.  Unlike perversely evil agents, the purely evil agent is not motivated to prioritize 
self-love over the moral law because the motivating incentives of self-love have triumphed over 
the incentives of the moral law.  As discussed extensively in previous sections of this thesis, this 
conceptualization of evil intentions escapes the label of perverse or instrumental evil since the 
agent in question does not couch their pursuits in relation to some closeted good.  Additionally, 
this agent cannot be rightly called amoral because he/she does care about morality—just not the 
side of the moral issue one expects.    
 However, Kant in Religion does not seem consider purely evil agency to be 
distinguishable from ordinary (i.e. perverse) evil.  He frames evil for evil’s sake within the 
domain of the diabolical—as belonging to some other otherworldly being.
150
  Based on Kant’s a 
priori considerations above, the human being is limited to the extent that one cannot excise the 
moral law and coherently retain one’s rational nature and sense of freedom.  Kant’s rejection of 
diabolical or pure evil is fueled by his a priori considerations outlined above in Religion and his 
other works.  Though agents may prioritize the incentives of self-love over the moral law, they 
cannot be so completely dedicated to self-love as to render the moral law empty; it must remain 
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as a possible configuration of the human being’s Gesinnung.
151
  To be human is to have at least 
some remnant in which the moral law can be motivating.  Thus, human beings cannot be purely 
evil because they cannot eradicate the moral law without consequence (e.g. losing one’s own 
humanity).   
 As section 2.2 outlined, pure evil agency seems to turn the MIT on its head.   The purely 
evil agent, as defined throughout this inquiry, seems to precisely counteract the idea that an 
agent’s moral judgment of what is good contains sufficient motivation to act on it.  Kant, though, 
uses an a priori framework in which the moral law stands above repudiation and even the most 
evil of human beings still possesses some natural predisposition to the moral law.  The exception 
to this—the diabolical or purely evil will—cannot be embodied within human beings.  To choose 
evil-qua-evil, the purely evil agent upon recognition of the moral law must immediately renounce 
the moral law on its own basis.  To do so would be a corruption of the very source of reason 
which the moral law makes possible in the first place.  Such an incentive, according to Kant, is 
rooted in a malignant reason and cannot be exercised by a human will.
152
  While human beings 
have the freedom to choose either a good or evil will, there is never a time where either incentives 
of one are completely eradicated.  The moral law, no matter how much it is de-prioritized, always 
remains in the picture.  Thus Kant’s internalist account of evil seems to escape the difficulties that 
were presented in the previous chapters by preserving the concept of pure evil but regulating it to 
other forms of agency distinctly non-human. 
 There is more to Kant’s account that needs to be explored.  The basic outline of Kant’s 
approach in this section subtly brings together the concerns of the first chapter and the nuanced, 
theoretical details of the second chapter.  But there still remains a lingering sentiment that pure 
evil—or something that closely resembles it—is realizable for certain agents while also retaining 






their humanity.  The use of literature in sections 1.1 and 1.2 was instrumental to illustrating the 
utter flexibility that evil characters can have.  Some of these characterizations brought to light 
another dimension of evil agency that seemed to mirror the opposite of moral sainthood, a kind of 
principled stance towards being evil.  The incentive to destroy that which is good for the sheer 
reason of reveling in the act for itself does not seem beyond human capacities but in some sense 
is at the very core of the concept of evil in moral discourse—especially when reflecting on the 
depths in which Dostoevsky and others portray humanity.  One must, contrary to Kant, take this 
phenomenon as it stands and seek out ways to make sense of it.  Is there a way to salvage some 
instantiation of pure evil within motivation internalism as well as Kant’s theory of moral agency 
















 The previous chapter gave a basic understanding of the motivation internalism and 
externalism debate.  Both metaethical positions explicitly oppose one another on the issue of 
whether an agent’s moral judgments are necessarily motivating (irrespective of the agent’s 
subsequent actions).  While the externalist argues that an agent can make judgments and be 
entirely unmoved by them, the internalist maintains that judgments by their very nature convey a 
“pro-attitude” that impacts one’s actions.  Even if one’s judgments are undermined by other 
motivations or circumstances, the internalist can still appeal to the original motivation to form the 
judgment to begin with that failed to be carried into action.  Or perhaps the judgment itself was 
not genuine in the first place.  The bulk of chapter two outlined these explanations and some 
implications on moral agency.  The introduction of purely evil agency complicated this debate 
even further. 
 Immanuel Kant’s approach, briefly outlined in section 2.3, provides an a priori basis for 
the MIT and furthermore posits an account of evil that conceptually recognizes evil-qua-evil 
motivation but at the same time rejects any human exemplification of it.  Kant’s account presents 
a remarkably structured understanding of evil that avoids much of the issues that plagued chapter 
two.  But a major concern still remains.  Can motivation internalism not just account for the 
concept of purely evil motivation but also make room for the conceptual possibility of purely evil 
human beings?  Though Kant seems to reject the hypothesis, this chapter will explore whether 
there is a gap within Kant’s internalism for human beings to express purely evil motivations. 
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 Section 3.1 will outline Kant’s three grades of evil that arise out of human beings’ 
general propensity towards evil.  These different levels of evil relate in many ways to the various 
instances of agency discussed earlier—amoral, akratic, and perversely evil agency.  Section 3.2 
will address Kant’s view of the diabolical with reference to his three grades of the evil propensity 
in humans.  Also, diabolism will be contrasted with this inquiry’s conceptualization of purely evil 
agency in order to demonstrate critical differences.  These critical differences between the 
diabolical being and the human being with evil-qua-evil motivation will be utilized in section 3.3 
in order to see if there is room in Kant’s a priori account of evil for evil-qua-evil motivation as a 
conceptual possibility for human beings.  Appealing to the views of Paul Formosa and Irit Samet-
Porat, it will be argued that Kant’s account of evil does have room for human agency that can 
pursue evil for itself.  Without undermining Kant’s rejection of a diabolically evil human being 
and at the same time giving humanity the potential to realize destructive and principally evil 
tendencies, this modified view of Kantian evil seems to further strengthen the motivation 
internalist position explored in chapter two.  These considerations may offer this inquiry the 
insights it seeks.   
86 
3.1 The Three Grades of Evil 
Immanuel Kant’s a priori analysis in Religion derives evil from the heterogeneous 
structure of the human will, a result of the freedom to legislatively prioritize the incentives of 
self-love over the moral law.  Section 2.3 outlined some of the important components of Kant’s 
internalism and the identification of evil as originating in the agent’s Gesinnung (disposition).  
However, there are psychological nuances to the way self-love can manifest in the human 
creature once it is incorporated as the ultimate principle of maxim-selection.  Just as section 1.1 
established multifarious parameters to being evil, self-love also admits of degrees or grades.  This 
ranking of evil offers a certain depth to Kant’s internalism in which amorality, akrasia, and most 
perverse evil can be explained without much difficulty.  Surveying Kant’s three grades of evil 
will be important for later sections as there may be a gap or opening in his views for enigmatic 
human beings to take the principle of self-love to new extremes—such as the prospect of evil-
qua-evil motivation first introduced in section 1.1. 
The three distinct grades of evil described by Kant in Religion are frailty, impurity, and 
wickedness (or corruption) of the human heart.
153
  Each grade represents a particular way human 
beings can de-prioritize the moral law.  The first, frailty, quite explicitly covers instances of 
akrasia.  Kant references the lamentations of the Apostle Paul (“Willing I have indeed, but 
perform the good I cannot!”) to highlight the agent suffering from a frail will.
154
  As discussed 
extensively in section 2.1, the akratic agent is not ignorant of what is deemed morally good.  
Neither is the agent willfully drawn to do what is considered evil.  Put in Kantian terms, the 
objective apprehension of the moral law does not guarantee that an agent will subjectively 
incorporate the relevant meta-maxim(s) into their will.  In other words, acceptance of the moral 
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law does not assure an agent’s motivation to act in that fashion.
155
  The human will, being 
susceptible to frailty by every kind of condition, can be enticed away from adhering to the moral 
law.  Some of these conditions have already been discussed in section 2.1 (e.g. depression, 
addiction, rage).        
The second grade of evil, impurity, identifies agents with a will that does not adhere to 
the moral law for duty’s sake.  One performs what is deemed morally good for some other sake—
perhaps due to some external influence (e.g. “God wants me to do ‘X’”) or utility (e.g. “It is in 
my self-interest or for the greater good that I do X”)—whereas the good will “admit[s] the law 
alone into itself as sufficient incentive.”
156
  This grade designates not just some of the perversely 
evil agents described in section 1.1 but also encompasses most agents at some point or another—
even those in moral discourse one would presumably call good.  To make moral decisions 
prudentially based on circumstance or feeling as opposed to principally based on reason and duty 
is the mark of impurity.  As Kant similarly argued in Groundwork, an action ceases to have 
genuine moral worth if the motive to act on it is conditioned by some desire or feeling.
157
   
A utilitarian, for instance, may determine (via the Greatest Happiness principle) the 
appropriate action that corresponds with the moral law based on considerations about the welfare 
of the agents in the situation and the outcomes that would likely result from said action.  The 
utilitarian decision-procedure, though, is impure because the action is not approached from the 
unadulterated motives of duty.  Like Bernard Williams’ Jim and Indians case discussed in section 
2.1, the utilitarian determination of what is good can easily give way to circumstances that dictate 
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violating one’s own integrity or those of others—even if the conditions may be extremely 
unlikely.  While the utilitarian may regularly judge and act in accordance with the moral law as 
legally moral, the intention of incorporating the moral law as a rational duty and priority within 
one’s incentives is neglected.  There is more to morality and being a morally good person for 
Kant than simply doing the right thing.  Having the appropriate motives establishes the a priori 
principle that determines one’s basis for maxim-selection.  Adopting a view that emphasizes cost-
benefit analysis of actions undermines duty to the moral law as a priority in one’s incentives.             
Perhaps one can go so far as to say that the utilitarian ethic—like most consequentialist 
ethics—lends agents to develop an evil Gesinnung, whereas an ethic of duty aids toward the 
development of a good Gesinnung since one’s motivating reasons for action would not be far 
removed from Kant’s deontological ethic.
158
  Any agent that tries to include an extra incentive 
within their duty to the moral law subsequently undermines the moral worth of his/her actions.  
The unadulterated performance of duty for itself demonstrates the unqualified commitment of an 
agent’s good will and preserves the agent’s respect for the moral law as independent of other 
inclinations.  In any case, it is not enough that an agent performs a morally good action, but also 
that the action is done with the proper order of priority within one’s incentives for action (via the 
a priori principle of maxim-selection). 
Kant’s motivation internalism is informed by his normative theory of ethics.  The 
utilitarian has adopted incentives that have diluted rational respect for the moral law in favor of 
cultivating reasons dependent on some given condition(s).  Utility is not only irrelevant to moral 
evaluation, according to Kant, but also can readily be a pathological obstacle to fulfilling one’s 
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duty for duty’s sake.
159
  As such, the impurity of the human will can occur when an agent arrives 
at moral judgments on the basis of hypothetical or conditional reasons rather than categorical or 
non-conditional reasons.  The moral law ceases to be a sufficient incentive for action when agents 
put their feelings or desires on par with (or supersede) duty.  One need not explicitly or 
consciously prioritize the inclinations of self-love to forsake one’s rational duty to the moral law.   
There is a crucial difference, in Kant’s estimation, between the person who performs 
good actions because they feel right and the person who performs good actions because they 
conform with a rational duty to the moral law.  Even if such agents do not explicitly perform evil 
or immoral actions, they have established a motivational foundation that ultimately lacks proper 
moral force.  A human being of good morals can possibly live a life to the letter of the moral law, 
but to be a morally good human being necessitates also adhering to the “spirit” of the moral law 
as “the sole and supreme incentive.”
160
  Agents can have their judgments (and consequently their 
actions) be compliant with what the moral law dictates, but such judgments require a will that has 
incorporated the proper principle of maxim-selection in order to be considered morally good.   
Moral judgments cannot find permanence within incentivized appeals to desires or 
prudential circumstances—what Kant categorizes as hypothetical imperatives.  The statement “If 
you want to avoid going to jail, then you should not (among other things) steal other people’s 
possessions” is persuasive only if an agent affirms the logical relation between the antecedent and 
the consequent of this statement and finds the desire (motivationally) compelling to warrant 
compliance.  There are likely agents that do not care whether they are caught or are not threatened 
by the prospect of discovery.  Moral considerations based on hypothetical imperatives could 
easily evaporate if prudence fails to motivate such an agent.  Kant’s second grade of evil here 
seems to signify the tendency of the human will to value and misattribute morality to prudential 
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reasoning.  Thus, while impurity is a lower grade than wickedness, there is a sense in which 
impurity could naturally lead over time to further corruption.   
The third and final grade of evil is wickedness when an agent’s will directly incorporates 
the incentives of self-love—hence establishing an evil Gesinnung.  Such a disposition orients the 
agent’s judgments to openly act contrary to the moral law.  For Kant it represents the zenith of 
evil in the human creature because the agent has established as the basis for determining action 
incentives that are utterly corrosive to individual autonomy as a rational being.  Whereas the 
second grade of evil, impurity, designates an agent that may briefly flirt with the incentives of 
self-love as a means to objectively fulfill the moral law, the corrupted will makes its home in self-
love as the preferred order of priority for deciding how judgments are formulated.  The moral law 
takes a back seat as other inclinations are given consideration.  Pablo Muchnik makes similar 
remarks in the following passage: 
“Although in frailty and impurity the moral incentive does not receive authority 
in the motivational structure, the agent makes at least a lukewarm attempt to 
acknowledge the outweighing character of moral reasons. In perversity, all 
pretenses fall off: the agent unabashedly places herself above the law. Instead of 
hiding and justifying the inversion of the order of priorities, like in other 
propensities, this type of agent willfully embraces it.”
161
   
While this might sound very similar to the characterization of pure evil described in 
previous sections, for reasons that will be explored later Kant dismisses the possibility of human 
beings embracing self-love for itself.  He refers to such evil as diabolism and quickly distances it 
from wickedness or any other grade of evil.  The diabolical agent extirpates the moral law while 
the wicked merely dethrones the moral law from the order of priority in favor of other, contrary, 
inclinations.  Thus, human beings are conceptually limited a priori on the extent self-love is 
incorporated into their legislative will.  To understand the limitations of the human evil in this 
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capacity, one should consider of how all three grades of evil establish limitations on the human 
will to choose evil.   
 Regardless of whether the moral law is even consulted at all, it nonetheless remains in the 
background within all three grade of evil—even the wicked agent can only de-prioritize the moral 
law but never eradicate it as a potential choice.  This critical insight demonstrates an important 
aspect of Kant’s version of motivation internalism, which underlies his rejection of diabolism for 
human beings.  However much a human being may rebuke or revile the moral law, there must 
still be some “germ” of original good that one is receptive to (what Kant designates as a 
predisposition to humanity).
162
  That is, the possibility of the moral law as a motivating incentive 
for the basis of one’s principle of maxim-selection (or meta-maxim) must be present for any 
agent to have the power of choice.  Otherwise, allowing the incentives of self-love too much 
persuasive force over the moral law (insofar as one can renounce it entirely like the diabolical 
agent can) would undermine Kant’s sensitive notion of freedom.  Lawrence Pasternack makes the 
same observation below: 
 “Kant needs his account of evil to find a middle course between diabolism and 
unintentional immorality. He is neither willing to accept the possibility that an 
agent can directly reject the moral law, nor is he willing to mitigate freedom 
through heightening the power of sensible inclination.”
163
   
The latter is particularly relevant to this section as it relates to the amplification of each 
successive grade of evil towards, but never quite reaching, the extreme of diabolism.  How does 
Kant limit and curve the power of sensible inclination in his three grades so to prevent any agent 




                                                          
162
 Kant, Religion, 30 [AK 6:28]. 
163
 Lawrence Pasternack, “Can Self-Deception Explain Akrasia in Kant’s Theory of Moral Agency?”, 
Southwest Philosophy Review 15, no 1 (2000): 93.   
164
 See in particular Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 159-161. 
92 
The first two grades are marked with self-deception based upon the lack of intent that 
both have towards prioritizing the moral law.  The frail agent is deceived about the motivational 
strength of the moral law and resigned to give in to the incentives of self-love.  Muchnik 
describes the process of self-deception for the frail agent as the rationale that “Since I 
incorporated the good (the law) into my maxim, any deviation is not really due to my evil heart, 
but to the weakness of will, of which I am not entirely responsible, since frailty is part of human 
nature.”
165
  The frail agent is neither fully committed to self-love nor the moral law, but 
nonetheless grants primacy to the incentives of self-love due to a perceived lack of strength.  As 
such, the agent’s objective awareness of the moral law falls short of being subjectively motivating 
when stronger inclinations come into the picture.   
Recall earlier that section 2.1 described instances of depression and addiction as typical 
cases of akrasia or weakness of will.  The psychological well-being of an agent as well as the 
capacity for moral deliberation, which would be otherwise operating normally, can be severely 
strained given these harrowing conditions.  While the person suffering from depression or 
addiction may insist or make it seem as if the choice is outside of their control, Kant would 
maintain that the dominance of inclination “can only be the result of the will’s ‘taking’ the 
sensible incentive as motivating …in terms of the comparative weakness of the moral 
incentive.”
166
  Such agents can be indicted as nonetheless making a choice to submit to the 
perceived stronger inclination when, for Kant, there is sufficient incentive already to adopt the 
moral law.  The frail agent hides making a choice in favor of self-love as one’s meta-maxim in 
this instance; and under the guise of a weak heart, the agent utilizes self-deception in thinking that 
he/she lacks inner strength to repel seemingly overwhelming conditions.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
“…[I]t is also necessary to assume that self-deception, which Kant only mentions in connection with the 
third degree, or intentional guilt, is operative from the beginning and, indeed, is an essential ingredient in 
the propensity to evil.”  
165




  The impure agent, on the other hand, is self-deceived by means of believing one is acting 
with the moral law in mind when it is actually an inclination inspired by the principle of self-love.  
An agent may act in accordance with the moral law, but it is done for the wrong reasons or 
motives.  The agent’s good actions are incidental rather than being representative of motive of a 
good will.  The person who refuses to steal because it displeases others acts on a motive that is 
dependent on wanting to fulfill that desire (of not displeasing others).  The person who refuses to 
steal because it is a violation of duty places morality on an unconditional ground over and above 
sensuous inclinations.  Whereas the frail agent is objectively aware of this duty to the moral law 
and fails to act on it due to some perceived (i.e. imagined) weakness of will, the impure agent’s 
self-deception is simply one of error and ill-conceived ignorance.  Though the impure agent may 
do what is good without hesitation, he/she does not have an “attitude within the law of duty”
167
 
which signifies a properly moral understanding.  
One cannot help but think that John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism, a theory which Kant 
would presumably oppose, is unintentionally guilty
168
 of diluting the moral law to incentives that 
are contrary to designating genuine moral worth on one’s actions.  The fact that the Kantian good 
will and Mill’s “impartial and benevolent spectator”
169
 could produce similar judgments in moral 
situations is merely incidental.  Utilitarian moral reasoning, as Bernard Williams argued earlier, is 
relative to the situation such that lying, stealing, or perhaps even murder may be obligatory in 
order to satisfy the greatest good for the greatest number.  This is again because of the distinction 
between hypothetical and categorical imperatives highlighted earlier in Kant’s Groundwork and 
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other writings.  The utilitarian, as an impure agent, has deceived himself into thinking that his 
deliberations and motives are in accordance with moral duty when they are in fact superficially 
conditional and can readily evaporate (or be overridden by other circumstances) in an instant.  
Kant’s identification of moral goodness as a principled grounding gets to the core of his three 
propositions of morality in the Groundwork.
170
    
 The wicked agent takes impurity to its next level and, for Kant, the final manifestation of 
the evil Gesinnung attainable for humans.  Wickedness encompasses a fully matured self-
deception that outright neglects the moral law and directly embraces the reversal of incentives 
that prioritizes the principle of self-love as one’s meta-maxim.  Kant quite clearly labels 
wickedness as a “corruption and perversity of the human heart.”
171
  As such, the agent has 
systematically deceived oneself in the worst way possible.  Muchnik concisely describes this in 
the following passage: 
 “An agent with a depraved heart does not simply transform morality into a 
system of conditional imperatives, but perverts moral judgment at its root. In 
depravity, deliberation becomes oblivious of morally salient features that 
accompany actions, and such insensitivity opens the possibility of maximum 
wrongdoing…Although [the agent with a depraved heart] is aware of what 
morality requires, she grants herself ‘moral holidays’ and callously uses everyone 
else as a tool to her goals, justifying her conduct in terms of a preserve [sic] 
conception of the good.”
172
     
The systematic self-deception presented here is more corrosive to the agent than in the previous 
two grades.  Instead of an agent (impurely) mitigating the dictates of the moral law through 
sensuous inclinations, the wicked agent adopts the incentives of self-love at face value and 
deceives oneself in thinking that one’s conduct is good.  As such, the wicked agent is at the same 
footing as the perversely evil agent with a twisted understanding of good whereby the term 
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“good” is disassociated with any real or imagined sense of duty.    The impure agent still respects 
his/her duty to fulfill the moral law, but fails to grasp its proper form (e.g. the utilitarian).  The 
wicked agent, though, forsakes duty entirely and acts on (selfish) impulse.  
Kant does not want to designate wickedness as malice.
173
  In part, this hastily associates 
acts of cruelty and viciousness with an agent’s Gesinnung (i.e. disposition or attitude).  Like 
impurity, wickedness can be compatible with lawful moral action but “no matter how virtuous 
someone may be, whatever good he can do is yet merely duty.”
174
  A change of heart is required 
within one’s Gesinnung to be morally good.  Kant describes malice in the strict meaning of the 
word as a taking evil-qua-evil into one’s maxims.
175
  If so, the agent would not be (self-) deceived 
about choosing evil as good and instead relishes what is evil for itself.  This would make the 
agent diabolically evil rather than wicked.  
While this grade of evil is a step above impurity, wickedness is not choosing evil for its 
own sake either.  The moral law is (deceptively) ignored or dismissed in place of something else, 
but never eliminated as a possible choice.  Self-deception acts as a limitation on all three grades 
of evil in order to preserve the freedom that humans have between animal impulse and rational 
determinism.  If a wicked agent ceased to be self-deceived and incorporated evil as evil into their 
maxims, then the agent would become diabolical and be rendered non-human—a conceptual 
absurdity.  Such maliciousness in one’s Gesinnung cannot be maintained by any human capacity 
to reason without falling into absurdity and contradiction.         
The basic reasons for Kant’s rejection of the possibility of diabolical evil for human 
beings have already been introduced in section 2.3.  It was remarked then that Kant’s internalism 
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seems to side with Anscombe and McNaughton’s views in section 1.2 when discussing the extent 
of Satan’s motivations in Milton’s Paradise Lost.  This section’s outline of Kant’s three grades of 
evil seems to further support that, based on the particular degree (i.e. grade) by which evil takes 
root in an agent’s legislative will, any human case of evil-qua-evil motivation must be 
misperceived as some perverse conception of good or identified as some other end (e.g. evil-qua-
power, evil-qua-desire, etc).  To say that one can choose evil for itself would be a misnomer 
since, for Kant, the moral law is necessary for structural autonomy in the first place.  Human 
beings simply cannot be free, or rational, and renounce the moral law without consequence.  
Given these further details in this section, a comparison needs to be made between this inquiry’s 
conceptualization of pure evil and Kant’s account of diabolical evil in Religion.  Are both notions 
equivalent?  Is it possible that evil-qua-evil motivation can be distinguished from Kant’s 
diabolical evil?  Furthermore, is there a way to fit this notion within Kant’s internalist account 











3.2 Diabolical Evil 
Kant’s diabolism in Religion draws limitations on human evil.  His rejection of a 
diabolically evil human being is consistent with his internalist model and a priori framework that 
underwrites it.  Human beings, as agents with inclinations that can conform to either reason or the 
passions, have a will that affords them the choice to set up an order of priority in their judgments 
and subsequent actions.  But, for Kant, there are boundaries that cannot be trespassed so long as 
one is human.  Simply put, the evil that any human being incorporates as the basis of their 
maxims does not purposefully desire to do evil but rather is under a spell of self-deception.  The 
three grades of evil described in the previous section indicated multifarious ways human beings 
can have the principle of self-love ground their evil Gesinnung (disposition).  But being evil for 
evil’s sake (i.e. evil-qua-evil motivation) is not represented in any of those grades.  Perhaps it has 
no possible human derivation here and is entirely within the domain of the diabolical?  This 
stance needs to be explored and contrasted with the conceptualization of pure evil provided in 
section 1.1.  Ultimately, this section will not only distinguish between Kant’s diabolism and pure 
evil but also will suggest that evil-qua-evil motivation is not necessarily tied to the diabolical 
alone. 
 To briefly summarize Kant’s rejection of a diabolical agent, he argues that thinking about 
a human being choosing evil for itself is “tantamount to thinking a cause operating without any 
laws.”
176
  If humans have freedom of choice by which some actions are imputed over others, then 
such agents must have another option that ensure judgments are freely made and not causally 
determined one-sidedly.  In other words, neither self-love nor the moral law can overwhelmingly 
fix the individual’s choice on the matter.  There must be more than one incentive to incorporate as 
a principle of maxim-selection.  Otherwise, the idea of a free choice is rendered absurd because 
the deck is stacked to where only one option determines an agent’s motivational allegiance.  As a 
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result, there would be nothing to demarcate and impute free choice within an agent’s judgment 
(and actions). 
 By exclusively incorporating self-love and expunging the moral law as a possible 
incentive in itself, the diabolical will represents a one-sided commitment to the principle of self-
love.  The imputation of this agent’s actions as a product of free choice becomes null and void.  
As such, freedom is restrained (i.e. limited) because actions necessitate some “mark of agency or 
authorship”
177
 without which agents cannot inscribe their judgments as freely chosen.        
Muchnik, earlier in section 2.3, explained this in terms of the “human in-between” 
whereby free choice is found between the animalistic impulses of passion and pure reason 
underlying the moral law.  Human volition is “characterized by its structural heterogeneity…were 
the human will directly determined by sensuous impulses, it would be animal; but were reason 
always sufficient to move it, it would become holy.”
178
  Diabolical evil upsets this delicate 
balance and undermines the heterogeneous structure of the human will.  Agents would be one-
sided or univocal in their judgments.  There is not a capacity to do otherwise or the possibility for 
a change of heart.  Like the animal and divine wills, the diabolical will is homogenously 
structured.  The thought process by which evil is “chosen” for itself portrays a mechanical drive 
absent of Kant’s a priori parameters on freedom.  As a result, the conditions of diabolical evil 
stand starkly opposed to every notion of what it means to be human: an autonomous, rational, and 
deliberative being.   
Kant’s “Reciprocity thesis”
179
 also attaches the same concerns to the rationality of 
agency.  Human beings, for Kant, are dependent upon the existence of the moral law because the 
very structure of reason would be incomprehensible without it.  The moral law establishes a 
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ground by which the agent’s will can autonomously subject itself to laws.  Without the moral law 
at all there cannot be any free action, but merely a lawless anarchy.  The lack of structure or order 
in an agent dissolves any intelligible causality that can be imputable to action.  Hence, the 
diabolical will is contradictory due to the fact that it seeks to renounce the moral law using the 
power of autonomy and reason (malignantly) against its own causal origin.  Muchnik explains 
diabolical volition in terms of a “self-defeating motivational structure” that “deprives itself of 
reasons for action.”
180
  This is why self-deception is—and must be—a key feature of each grade 
of the evil propensity because it seems to be the only description that can coherently maintain the 
“in-between” of human freedom.                     
Diabolical evil is immune to self-deception since the will legislatively expels the 
motivational efficacy of the moral law and affirms the principle of self-love for itself.  As 
previously explored in sections 1.1 and 1.2, such an agent would be doing evil as evil (i.e. evil-
qua-evil) rather than a perverse view where evil (i.e. self-love) is perceived as good.  Whereas the 
three grades of evil can be attributed to some form of self-deception, the diabolical agent 
possesses a supra-human (as opposed to superhuman
181
) nature that can both deliberately and 
willfully do evil without being deceived.  This is quite different than wickedness which does evil 
under the prospect that it is actually good in the same way Milton’s Satan proclamation “Evil, be 
thou my Good” was considered a sophisticated perverse evil.            
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Also mentioned in section 1.2, Kant’s rejection of a diabolically evil human being seems 
to be indicative of rejecting evil-qua-evil motivation as a possible human pursuit.  An agent 
cannot be human and affirm evil for itself.  Or at the very least perhaps, one cannot retain any 
semblance of humanity with such a view.
182
  If a philosopher or some creative writer presents a 
case to the contrary, then they simply do not understand the a priori concept of pure reason and 
the ways in which human beings are respectively limited by the Incorporation and Reciprocity 
theses.  No matter how nuanced empirical evidence suggests the human potential towards 
destructive and devilish behavior, Kant’s a priori premises indicate that the legislative capacities 
of the human will must be deceived in some manner to affirm maxims that are contrary to the 
moral law.  As such, one cannot be both diabolically evil and human at the same time in the same 
respect.  Either the agent in question seems to be a diabolically evil human being but is in fact an 
otherworldly demon (i.e. non-human) or the agent is human and deviously perverse or wicked.    
Due to the above considerations, one might insist that purely evil agency must also be 
included as conceptually equivalent to Kant’s diabolism.  Does this require Kantians, like other 
internalists, to relegate pure evil within the domain of perversity (at least when it comes to human 
beings)?  Section 3.3 will have more to say on this question.  But first is there a difference 
between purely evil agency and Kant’s diabolical agent?  Is diabolism a requisite for agents to 
have evil-qua-evil motivation?   
In section 1.1, pure evil was defined as doing what is considered evil based primarily or 
exclusively on a principled notion of being evil—mirroring opposite of the saying “Be good for 
goodness sake”.  In other words, a purely evil agent is someone who does evil because of the fact 
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that it is evil.  Unlike Kant’s wicked agent, the purely evil agent does not make evil out to be 
good in some twisted or perverse context.  Just as someone may view that there is an inherent 
value to being a morally good person, the purely evil agent thinks there is an inherent value to 
being a morally evil person.  While the latter view may sound strange and unintuitive, the former 
view is a popular way for many laypersons and even some philosophers to think about moral 
questions such as “Why be good?”  One example is Colin McGinn.  In his book Moral Literacy, 
his explanation for why one should be a morally good person begins with the following: 
“What reason is there for being a good person? The answer is, there is no 
reason—or no reason that cuts deeper, or goes further, than the tautology 
“because goodness is good”. The reason you should be virtuous and not vicious 
is just that virtue is virtue and vice is vice…Moral justification, like all 
justification, comes to an end somewhere. At some point we have to simply 
repeat ourselves.”
183
   
If McGinn’s reasoning holds some significance for those in moral discourse, then perhaps 
the tautology “because evilness is evil” can conceivably constitute as justification for being an 
evil person.  The purely evil agent’s motives seem no different but are morally inverted to vice 
and being a morally evil person for its own sake instead.  There may be instrumental goods to 
being evil (e.g. pleasure, power, etc) just as there may presumably be expected perks for being 
good, but both the moral saint and purely evil agent prioritize their own principled grounds 
regardless of the beneficial or harmful consequences.  The capacity of a moral saint’s pure motive 
to do good for itself seems to solicit its reversal, an opposing capacity to do the contrary.    
Section 1.1 addressed the difficulty in identifying a concrete example of a purely evil 
human being.  While some possible candidates were suggested, the difficulty still persists.  Does 
this mean that the purely evil human being is as illusory (and unsubstantiated) as a diabolically 
evil human being?  But one could perhaps suggest the same about Kant’s good will in the 
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Groundwork.  That is, there seems to be a similar difficulty in clearly picking out a person of 
good will that represents the moral law as its sole determining ground.  The answer cannot be 
concluded by any amount of observation because one is dealing with the confines of a person’s 
private thoughts and motivations.   
Moral discourse often highlights candidates of moral sainthood like Gandhi, Martin 
Luther King Jr, and Mother Teresa.  But regardless of the weight empirical evidence one may 
have, there simply is no way to reliably assess the moral status of an agent from the outside 
looking in.  For Kant, it would be a mistake to conflate a good or evil will with the appearance of 
doing morally praiseworthy or blameworthy actions.  The issue of whether someone in their 
actions has prioritized the incentive to be good for goodness sake above all other interests 
necessarily admits of imprecision because people’s actions hardly tell the full story of their 
motivations.  Literature can perhaps offer some avenues to identifying patterns in agent thought, 
but there is no way to test one’s motivations without also losing the purity of the motive in the 
midst of analyzing it within action.  One cannot, a posteriori, approximate a good or evil 
Gesinnung—only a priori as a pure motive of agency.  
Kant would probably agree that many people have and are capable of conforming to the 
moral law for duty’s sake.  But, even if it were the case that such moral perfection were possible 
(to both do and have first-hand knowledge of), one should be skeptical of whether a human life 
can constantly maintain that high moral standing.  As the first two grades of evil in Kant’s 
account seemed to indicate, frailty and impurity are conditions of the structural heterogeneity of 
the human will such that every individual constantly struggles with this heterogeneity in their 
moral deliberations.  Even moral saints, by virtue of being human, are susceptible to mistakes and 
imperfection.  But that does not mean one should dismiss or reject moral sainthood wholesale.  
Should not pure evil be afforded at least the same consideration?   
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 At the very least then the purely evil and diabolical agents respectively share the same 
definitional parameters of doing evil for itself.  But diabolism has one critical feature that 
separates it from purely evil agency.  A diabolical agent, by Kantian standards, is not a human 
being but rather some being that transcends reason and human volition.  Throughout this inquiry, 
purely evil agency has been defended as applicable to humanity.  While this may be merely a 
matter of semantics, pure evil does not necessarily have to be associated with devilishness or 
diabolical beings.  Thus, evil-qua-evil motivation may not be exclusively part of a diabolical will 
and human beings can partake in it without being considered diabolical.    
 At this juncture, there seems to be a major point of difference between Kant’s diabolism 
and purely evil agency.  Just as purely good and purely evil intentions reflect each other in terms 
of methodology, one can recognize the moral saint and its evil counterpart pertaining to opposite 
ends of the moral spectrum as exemplars.  Peter Brian Barry calls this the “mirror thesis,” the 
notion that moral saints and moral monsters mirror each other “insofar as the characters of each 
are marked by similar aretaic properties…each is an instance of the highest degree of 
something.”
184
  For Kant, though, human beings cannot mirror the evil counterpart of a good will 
to the extreme of diabolism.  But Kant’s rejection here need not include all instantiations of evil-
qua-evil motivation.  Diabolism requires more than a pure principled stance to do what is evil.  It 
signifies lawlessness and the lack of a causal structure by which a will can rationally impute free 
choice in one’s actions.  As such, the one-sidedness of the diabolical will does not complement 
section 1.1’s conceptualization of pure evil and one would be mistaken to suggest that pure evil is 
fully encompassed within diabolism.   
Whereas the diabolical agent is purely devoid of the moral law’s irresistibility and the 
will is monopolized towards the principle of self-love, the purely evil agent inverts the moral 
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law’s motivational value as incentive to do evil rather than renouncing it entirely.  In other words, 
the purely evil agent takes the irresistibility of the moral law as motivation to do its contrary—
self-love.  Far from extirpating the moral law, the purely evil agent has an immediate objective 
apprehension of the good and subjectively fixes it as an incentive.  But whereas the wicked agent 
operates on the belief that self-love is good, the purely evil agent approves of the moral law as 
good for the expressed purpose of prioritizing evil above it.   Paul Formosa makes similar 
remarks below about the possibility of divorcing evil-qua-evil motivation as exclusively 
diabolical within Kant’s account of evil: 
“Kant (or the Kantian) can make sense of the possibility that a person might 
choose evil qua evil…The affront to our self-conceited conception of ourselves, 
the attack on our pride and the swift rebuke to our arrogance dished out by the 
consciousness of the moral law can (perhaps) lead to a ‘rebellious attitude’ of 
resentment and hatred toward the law itself. To act directly upon this hubristic 
hatred of the law is to choose evil qua evil.”
185
 
The parallel between the purely evil human being and the saintly human being maintains Kant’s 
diabolism but at the same time retains the possibility that human beings can do evil for itself.  Just 
as Kant’s three grades of evil outlined in section 3.1 show the progression by which an agent’s 
will can develop an evil Gesinnung, this grading could also conceivably be inverted for evil.   
It is not such a stretch of the imagination to conceive of an evil-doer undergoing the same 
process of Kant’s grading but in terms of evil to progressively good in attitude (i.e. Gesinnung) 
due to frailty, impurity, and corruption.  Evil agents can presumably experience moments of 
weakness, fail to do what is evil due to some other conflicting incentive, and perhaps even 
experience remorse or guilt over their failure to do what is evil as much as any good agent in the 
contrary situation.  In the midst of doing a principally evil act, the agent can be susceptible to any 
number of emotions or circumstances that could be seen as overriding.  For example, the agent 
could immediately suffer from depression and become listless to all his/her activities.  Perhaps 
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the agent gets attached emotionally to others such that those relationships impede any evil 
motivations.  This can seemingly lead to other conditions that can gradually convert the evil agent 
to have a change of heart and have a good Gesinnung instead. 
In terms of impurity, evil agents can perform a legally evil action but not according to the 
“proper” order of priority for the evil Gesinnung.  The purity of the evil agent’s motive to do the 
action out of duty to self-love is “corrupted” by other incentives such as pleasure, power, glory, 
etc.  As such, the agent is motivationally disposed towards the instrumental gain or consequences 
of the evil act instead of the principle of the action itself.  The agent no longer does evil as evil 
but rather tells himself that the action is justifiably good in some evaluative sense.  Lastly, an evil 
agent can succumb to the next grade where “corruption” by the moral law’s incentives lead to a 
change of heart in one’s Gesinnung.  Self-love no longer is prioritized as the agent’s meta-maxim 
and the moral law takes hold and puts incentives into their proper order of priority.     
This is obviously manipulating Kant’s grading of evil by suggesting that the moral law 
for a thoroughly evil agent can be inverted to a completely opposite “evil law” such that a human 
being can perceive a moral duty is to do what is evil (i.e. contrary to the categorical imperative).  
Kant himself would likely object to treating evil on the same level as the moral law.  For evil to 
be done as evil requires an utterly malignant reason beyond human capacity.  But examining the 
similarities between the pure motives of Kant’s good will and the possible pure motives of an evil 
will may offer a critical distinction between Kant’s diabolism and section 1.1’s account of pure 
evil. 
  Naturally, one can criticize the mirror thesis and the motivational inversion of the moral 
law in multiple ways.  Some things are being taken for granted and can be questioned.  It is not 
quite evident that to think about moral sainthood requires the antithesis of its opposite extreme—
the (im)moral monster.  Nonetheless, significant portions of the next section will base its 
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reasoning on an implicit acceptance of this premise.  Before moving on to the next topic, some 
criticisms will be introduced to highlight the difficulty of this purely conceptual reasoning.  
 In Plato’s dialogue Phaedo, Socrates makes a number of arguments that depend on this 
very notion of opposite values or concepts.  Generally called the argument from opposites, Plato’s 
Socrates suggests that “all things which come to be…[come] from their opposites if they have 
such, as the beautiful is the opposite of the ugly and the just of the unjust, and a thousand other 
things of the kind.”
186
  With Cebes as the interlocutor, Socrates produces the following reductio 
ad absurdam argument: if being dead is the opposite of being alive and vice versa, then neither 
cannot admit of the other without contradiction.  The contradiction is that if the living does not 
come into being from an opposing status (i.e. death), then there is a lack of balance between the 
two states of becoming such that everything would cease to be living at some point; but for 
Socrates this is simply not true.
187
   
Additionally, how can one make a distinction in the first place without some comparison?  
That is, how can one have knowledge of being awake without also being able to distinguish its 
opposite state?  The argument from opposites seems to operate on intuitive grounds.  Waking up 
necessitates a corresponding opposite (i.e. sleeping) just as any concept needs a boundary that 
delineates it from some other notion.  The person who has been asleep their whole life would 
know nothing of its opposite; nor would the person be able to tell the difference until the contrast 
presents itself.  If Socrates’ reductio holds that a concept such as being awake cannot be rendered 
sensible without some contrasting state (i.e. being asleep), then Socrates has seemingly affirmed 
his argument from opposites.  One can presumably subject the same reasoning for the opposites 
light/dark, beautiful/ugly, and as the mirror thesis suggests the moral saint and its direct reverse.  
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Cebes and the other interlocutors in the dialogue seemed to be easily convinced, but there are 
some avenues for criticism.    
Friedrich Nietzsche, in Beyond Good and Evil, strongly criticized taking this reasoning 
seriously as it represented a “faith (in opposite values)” and highlighted the “typical prejudgment 
and prejudice which give away the metaphysicians of all ages.”
188
  Nietzsche warns his readers to 
be skeptical of what seems like a natural thought process.  There is a danger in falling prey to 
language and the way it can manipulate one’s thinking.  
 “How could anything originate out of its opposite? for example, truth out of 
error? or the will to truth out of the will to deception?... For one may doubt, first, 
whether there are any opposites at all, and secondly whether these popular 
valuations and opposite values on which the metaphysicians put their seal, are 
not perhaps merely foreground estimates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps 
even from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it was, to 
borrow an expression painters use.”
189
  
There does seem to be something suspicious about Socrates’ conceptual rationale and perhaps 
this relates to the mirror thesis as well.  The questionable assumption here is whether concepts as 
words can take on a meaning without some separation or comparison—as the argument from 
opposites seems to suggest.   
The mirror thesis at first glance seems to greatly resemble Socrates’ argument from 
opposites in the way abstract relations are dependent upon each other for coherence.  Everyone 
has likely heard at least on one occasion the common trope “one cannot have good without evil” 
in moral discourse.  Evil as a privation of the good continues to be a topic that occupies 
philosophers today as it did during Plato’s time and the Scholastics during the Middle Ages.  The 
predicament of evil’s existence and intelligibility also extends into philosophy of religion, 
epistemology, and metaphysics.  How can one have a notion of goodness if it is not being 
contrasted with some opposite state or privation?  This difficulty must be overlooked for now.  
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But Peter Brian Barry’s investigation of the mirror thesis in his own article explores many of its 
nuances that are largely off-topic (but still very intriguing) to this inquiry.  He does make one 
critical comment that is relevant to the Nietzschean criticism above. 
“To be sure, the mirror thesis is hardly adequate as an account of moral 
sainthood; roughly, it characterizes the structure of an evil person’s character but 
not its content. A full-blown account of evil personhood would also say 
something about what particular vices, if any, from which an evil person must 
suffer. Further, the mirror thesis does not explicitly suggest any particular 
relation between evil personhood and evil action, whatever relation that should 
be. But any account of evil personhood must start somewhere, and the mirror 
thesis represents a plausible place to start.”
190
 
While a “full-blown account of (evil) personhood” is not the primary aim of this thesis, 
exploring the motivational underpinnings of evil agency could yield content for normative ethical 
theorizing.  If evil acts can be (sincerely) chosen for themselves, then one could ascertain the 
vices that underlie the agent’s will to do what is evil.  Like the case of Satan’s pride in Paradise 
Lost, vices can be expressed in a pure form untainted by negativity or depravity.  Hence, the idea 
of a purely evil agent is the idea of someone who principally stands for the action in itself.  In 
other words, the action is itself the motive.
191
  However, human beings typically perform evil acts 
with motives that are corrupted by circumstances and oft-misplaced desires—as with various anti-
hero and anti-villain archetypes.   
This inquiry though must return to the task at hand, to understand evil within the Kantian 
internalist model of moral motivation.  For the time being, without dismissing or ignoring the 
above criticisms, the mirror thesis will be conditionally utilized for the purpose of advancing to 
the next topic. 
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Due in part to the mirror thesis, there seems to be a possible gap between the diabolical 
and purely evil.  This can have substantial implications for Kant’s account of evil as well as the 
motivation internalism/externalism debate in general depending on how one interprets the 
limitations of human evil.  The next section will explore two possible ways to incorporate evil-
qua-evil motivation into Kant’s thought.  One interpretation, suggestive of the approach above, 
will suggest that pure evil does not necessarily preclude the moral law.  That is, it can be viewed 
as a pernicious and exceedingly rare grade of evil either as an unconventional form of wickedness 
or as an entirely new grade of the evil beyond wickedness but not to the level of diabolism.  The 
other interpretation will suggest that Kant’s a priori rejection of diabolism is at the root of the 













3.3 The Purely Evil Human Being 
Kant’s a priori account of evil fits well with the concern at the very beginning of this 
thesis.  One should not readily accept the physical appearance of evil-doing and look beyond the 
images of evildoers in dark alleyways with sinister countenances.  For Kant, one must utilize a 
priori reasoning and delve into how the concepts of reason, autonomy, and morality relate to 
human beings.  The motivational depths of an agent’s thoughts and judgments here play a very 
pivotal role in understanding what it means to be evil.  There are constantly principles being 
prioritized or de-prioritized behind every judgment and action that one observes in moral conduct.  
Previous sections already outlined much of Kant’s account in this regard, but Kant’s rejection of 
the diabolically evil will puts his internalist position at a possible disadvantage comparable to 
other internalist views in chapter two.   
Section 3.1 explained Kant’s three grades or levels of evil as a propensity in the will that 
progressively (absent a sudden change of heart) settles into an evil Gesinnung.  But there is a 
stopping point for human beings.  One cannot be evil for its own sake, purely embracing the 
principle of self-love as the basis for one’s moral judgments.  If evil cannot be chosen for its own 
sake without contradiction, then motivation externalists can reiterate its conceptual coherency and 
their own flexibility on the matter.  Such examples were explored throughout the last two 
chapters and the both sides of the metaethical issue were given consideration on the matter.  
Kant’s account of evil, though, has flexibility of its own and can solidify the internalist position 
on this matter rather than echo the same internalist talking points.  The last section has opened up 
a possible gap in Kant’s account that can perhaps make it conceptually possible for human beings 
to be evil for evil’s sake.  Paul Formosa and Irit Samet-Porat have suggested a similar view, that 
Kantians can maintain evil-qua-evil motivation as conceptually possible for human beings 
without undermining the significance of Kant’s a priori principles.  Their views will be helpful in 
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this section to establish another way of interpreting Kant’s views on evil without outright 
rejecting his view of diabolism in Religion.    
To continue from the previous section, there seems to be a discrepancy between the 
purely evil agent as described here and the diabolical agent as described by Kant in Religion.  
While both share the motive to do what is evil as evil, the diabolical agent renounces the moral 
law entirely as opposed to the purely evil human agent who is portrayed as still operating within 
the realm of morality that utilizes the moral law as inversely motivating.  The purely evil agent 
here portrays a subtle dependency on the moral law’s existence in their will as something 
perceptively revulsive and detestable.  This dependency is due in large part to the mirror thesis 
which, outlined earlier in section 3.2, depicts the pure motive of respecting the moral law for its 
own sake as dependent upon an opposite capacity to act from a (pure) motive of hatred for the 
moral law.  Paul Formosa also seems to implicitly embrace the mirror thesis below in defending 
the possibility of evil-qua-evil motivation for humans: 
“Just as we can act for the sake of the positive feeling of respect, so too we can 
act for the sake of the negative feeling of pain and humiliation…To act directly 
upon this hubristic hatred of the law is to choose evil qua evil. It is to choose evil 
immediately and not for the sake of (and indeed in spite of) any mediate interest 
or inclination that precedes the representation of the moral law.”
192
 
 There is also a significant difference between the purely evil agent and Kant’s wicked 
agent.  As the previous sections indicated, wickedness is (self-deceptively) making evil out to be 
good in some perverse or twisted sense and not choosing evil as evil.  That is, the wicked agent 
explicitly prioritizes the principle of self-love above the moral law but considers one’s actions to 
be justifiably good.  Using the mirror thesis, there should also be motivational poles to the 
irresistible “thrust” of the moral law.
193
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Respect is merely one side of an agent’s dispositional spectrum with revulsion/hatred at 
the opposing end.  As the mirror thesis seemed to suggest earlier regarding opposite values, 
Formosa does not see any a priori reason from Kant’s position that prevents human beings from 
feeling only respect for the moral law.
194
  Furthermore, this attitude is motivationally distinct 
from wickedness in that the agent does not deceived himself in thinking what is evil is good.  
Samet-Porat also sees potential within this distinction, pointing out that “in such cases we are 
looking at a volitional structure in which goodness is recognized for what it is, but such a 
structure drives a person away by a deeply flawed rationality.”
195
 
Thus, between wickedness and diabolism, a conceptual gap is open for human beings to 
be purely evil in motive without trespassing on diabolical evil.  Formosa further suggests that 
Kant could conceptually account for evil-qua-evil motivation as an extreme—and albeit rare—
instance of human agency:   
“While spiteful hubris or perversity might be a sufficient ground to adopt maxims 
to pursue evil qua evil, this ability cannot turn us into devilish beings. A devilish 
being has an ‘evil reason’ and therefore lacks agency. A person who choose evil 
qua evil has agency and a will that, in the abstract, is good, but simply choose to 
make a particularly perverse use of that agency.”
196
   
Pure evil is not the same as diabolical evil because the moral law remains a motivational presence 
in the will’s adoption of a principle of maxim-selection.  While the moral law remains as an 
incentive (just completely inverted motivationally), the purely evil human agent cannot be 
relegated to one of Kant’s three grades of evil.  The agent is not self-deceived about the nature of 
their choice to do evil in the same way as the wicked agent.  That is, within the conditions of 
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frailty, impurity, and corruption, the purely evil human agent is not deceived about what one has 
chosen to incorporate as the basis of maxim-selection.      
 It was mentioned in section 1.2 that Kant’s rejection of a diabolically human being relates 
to Anscombe and McNaughton’s position that evil-qua-evil motivation is at bottom a closeted 
perverse evil that utilizes the term “evil” in an inverted-commas sense.  Muchnik similarly 
describes Kant’s rejection as not an expression of naiveté, but rather the belief “that finite rational 
agents, even as they disregard the moral law, act sub specie boni, no matter how distorted or 
perverse that supposition might be…we must represent our actions as pursuing something that 
matters to us, some good to which we bestow our interest.”
197
  Hence, one can take Kant’s 
rejection as endorsing the view that any human case of evil-qua-evil motivation is merely 
sophisticated perversity or wickedness (i.e. evil as an instrumental value rather than intrinsically 
valuable for itself).  Thus when Milton’s Satan proclaimed “Evil, be thou my Good,” Satan 
should not be thought as pursuing evil for itself but rather inventing his own conception of what 
is good to compete against God’s notion of goodness.  
The suggestion in section 1.2 to contest this view is that there is another sense one can 
value evil and not render it good in an evaluative sense.  That is, evil agents can recognize and 
positively perform evil acts as evil without changing their views on what is good.  Robert Dunn 
called it a formal sense of good based on a “criterion of success for any related action.”
198
  The 
proclamation “Evil, be thou my Good” could instead be read as revealing Satan’s complete 
inversion of his motivational compass.  As highlighted above, good no longer motivates in the 
sense that one respects the moral law but rather it inspires disgust and hatred.  Just like the purely 
evil agent, Milton’s Satan is not a wicked agent because there is a deliberate intentionality in 
choosing evil.  He presumably knows what evil is according to moral discourse and seeks to 
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perform it because it is evil.  The fact that something is normatively good serves as motivation to 
do the contrary.  To do evil for evil’s sake is something that far exceeds the evil propensity in 
frail, impure, and wicked agents.   
There are some problems with trying to fit evil-qua-evil motivation and the conceptual 
possibility of purely evil human agents within Kant’s views.  One problem is that self-deception 
plays a critical role for Kant in explaining how evil is imputable to judgments and actions.  There 
is a general consensus and worry among Kantian scholars on this point.
199
  If Kant’s Reciprocity 
thesis hinges on viability of the moral law as one of the candidates for a will to govern itself, then 
how does self-deception apply to the purely evil human beings?   
At face value, purely evil agency seems to rebuke this explanatory feature because evil-
qua-evil motivation does not admit, within an agent’s will to choose, self-deception.  Samet-Porat 
remarks that such agents generally display a “surprising degree of self-reflection” about their own 
actions and perhaps have first-person knowledge of their own psychology and moral 
development.
200
  Unlike other agents that can be discounted as ignorant (e.g. akratic, perversely 
evil, and amoral agents) or psychologically demented (e.g. psychopaths, serial killers, and 
wantons), purely evil agents exemplify the clarity and resolve to do evil within their motivational 
disposition (i.e. Gesinnung).  How can pure evil be integrated into a Kantian framework but still 
distinguish itself from other (perverse) grades of evil?  Perhaps there is a way to maintain Kant’s 
view here, as well as his rejection of diabolism, and leave open the conceptual possibility of 
purely evil human beings.     
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Considering the fact that purely evil human beings are so different from the garden-
variety evildoers one generally encounters in moral discourse, it should be expected that the basic 
understanding of self-deception needs to be adjusted.  In moral discourse, many agents are not 
motivated to do evil at all.  They sincerely want to do what is normatively good but may 
ignorantly do what is evil instead.  Some agents have perverse motives and deceived themselves 
in adopting a twisted conception of good.  Others can have amoral tendencies and convince 
themselves that their sincere moral judgments are not (inherently) motivating.  Pure evil, being an 
anomaly among evildoers, has a different thought process and motivational structure than any 
standard agent.   
Whereas most agents are victims to deceiving themselves about the knowledge of and 
judgment that “X is evil” due to frailty, impurity, or even corruption, the purely evil agent is not 
deceived in any of those ways about their choice to do evil.  Formosa makes a similar point that 
“self-deception enters into the story only if [an agent] tries to justify [himself].”
201
  Though purely 
evil humans do not attempt to explain away their evil actions, this should not exclude them from 
self-justification by some other avenue.  By process of elimination, self-deception must occur in 
the purely evil agent’s reversal of his motivational disposition of the moral law from respect to 
revulsion.  The agent implicitly believes himself to be justified and that the inversion of his 
motivational compass towards evil is something that he desires for itself.  As such, one can 
maintain Kant’s view that self-deception accompanies immorality by suggesting purely evil 
agents deceive themselves in thinking that they want to do evil as evil.                
Formosa in similar terms makes an interesting argument that people can be easily tricked 
into thinking someone is deliberately choosing evil.  He utilizes Kant’s account of passions in 
arguing that evil-qua-evil motivation can be mimicked in humans and that most cases of 
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destructive evil are instances of “passionate single-mindedness” or evil-qua-passion.
202
  What 
makes this different from diabolism is that the human passions are the source of the self-
deception for desiring evil for itself.  It also poses a difficulty with this section’s attempt to 
propose evil-qua-evil motivation as part of the evil propensity of human beings.   
Whether or not this interpretation is successfully convincing, the reality of pure evil is 
another matter entirely—one that this inquiry cannot address at this time.  While Formosa and 
Samet-Porat think pursuing evil for itself is conceptually possible for human beings and seek to 
constructively adjust Kant’s views with their own, both are hesitant to speak beyond the 
coherency of the concept.
203
  This difficulty was also mentioned in section 1.1 and 1.2 and must 
unfortunately be left without an answer.  Nonetheless, people can find many things motivating in 
life.  The prospect of being evil at face value is likely as much a motive as any other incentive for 
one’s actions.  However, there is no shame in acknowledging the rarity of evil-qua-evil 
motivation within human agency perhaps to the point of making it existent only as a conceptual 
possibility.  Appeals to literature and other creative avenues are the best resources available as 
tools of analysis in this endeavor.  But it would be a mistake to discount the plasticity of the 
human mind to motivate itself in unexpected ways, even a volitional/motivational structure that 
goes so far as to want to do what is evil for its own sake.   
As discussed in section 3.2, pure evil should not be equated to diabolism.  That is, evil-
qua-evil motivation is not a sufficient condition for diabolism as Kant has presented it.  To be 
diabolical additionally requires one to completely renounce the moral law as a viable basis for 
one’s actions.  But the purely evil human being, in pursuing evil for itself, depends upon the 
motivational inversion of the moral law.  Rather than eliciting feelings of respect, the moral law 
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inspires hatred and motivation to do contrary to what it dictates.  This view of evil-qua-evil 
motivation preserves Kant’s rejection of the diabolical and at the same time gives Kant’s account 
much needed flexibility.  Kant’s views on evil are not being contested, but rather modified to 
include a higher grade of evil beyond or within wickedness itself.   
Incorporating pure evil as an additional grade of evil within human beings, separate from 
the diabolical, allows Kantian reasoning to better accommodate the Dostoyevskian depths that 
humanity can descend.  Since diabolism no longer has a monopoly on the motivation to do evil 
for evil’s sake, it is not necessary to renounce the moral law in order to pursue evil as evil.  In 
fact, the moral law is just as necessary for the evil will as it is for Kant’s good will.  The decisive 
factor is the volitional structure of the purely evil agent undergoing a complete reversal in 
motivations.  Other aspects of Kant’s account are maintained as well.  Self-deception can still be 
attributable to immorality in the case of the purely evil agent, since it arises not in the choice 
itself but in the motivational shift of the agent.  One can still agree with Kant that the diabolical is 
not humanly possible, but insist that a malignant practical reasoning can possibly surface through 
human self-deception of one’s motivational allegiances as opposed to being mistaken about one’s 
evaluative knowledge of good and evil (in the case of other evil agents).  If Kant’s three grades of 
evil are viewed as ways in which human beings can motivationally deviate from the moral law,
204
 
then the purely evil human being represents the true zenith of human evil—even if it only exists 
as a conceptual possibility. 
There are less constructive views of Kant’s account of evil.  One way to address the 
predicament is to simply reject Kant’s rejection.  That is, not only should there be no a priori 
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limitations on the freedom to choose evil for itself but also human beings should be able to will 
anything including renouncing the moral law and becoming diabolical.  The previous view, 
inspired by Formosa and Samet-Porat, does not go this far; and it is unclear if negating Kant’s 
position is necessary or even advantageous to the aims of this inquiry.  Muchnik, among other 
Kantian scholars, has expressed strong reservations about completely doing away with Kant’s 
stance on diabolism: 
“No matter how many examples we may present of individuals that 
systematically oppose the moral law in their conduct, Kant could always shrug 
them off: observable conduct does not decide upon the validity of the normative 
dimension of the will (Wille). From a purely normative perspective, the agent’s 




Kant’s rejection of diabolical evil for human beings is more critical to his other projects than one 
might think.  An implication of disregarding Kant on this issue may possibly result in the collapse 
of key a priori principles established earlier (e.g. the Reciprocity Thesis, Incorporation Thesis, 
etc).  Unless one entertains the desire to rework Kant’s internalism at its a priori roots, the subtle 
revisions here that incorporate evil-qua-evil motivation within human beings’ evil propensity 
proves to be a simpler approach.   
Hence, it seems much more viable to take the view that was put forward at the start.  One 
can suggest, alongside Paul Formosa and Irit Samet-Porat, that Kant was perhaps too quick to 
dismiss evil-qua-evil motivation as a potentially human enterprise.  One can affirm Kant’s 
insistence that the moral law cannot be completely renounced (without thereby losing one’s status 
as a free agent), but make the case that human beings as purely evil (i.e. evil-qua-evil motivated) 
can retain some remnant of the moral law when one utilizes—as Formosa emphasized earlier—a 
“hubristic hatred of the moral law”
206
 as incentive to do the contrary.  The error of the wicked 
agent is being self-deceived about the features of one’s choice (i.e. making the principle of self-
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love to be good).  The purely evil human being, though, does not try to justify evil as good but 
pursues evil precisely because it is contrary to the moral law.  He principally deceives himself 
that his immediate hatred of the moral law is something worth pursuing as a formal good.  
Whereas the diabolical being renounces the moral law in its entirety and embodies a one-sided 
commitment to the principle of self-love, the purely evil agent has deceived himself in wishing to 
renounce the moral law when the very basis of his hatred of the moral law relies upon it.  This 
view maintains Kant’s rejection of diabolism for human beings, but brings much needed depth to 

















3.4 A Critical Objection 
In light of this interpretation of pure evil, there is a serious objection that could possibly 
undermine the whole account.  First, to briefly remind the reader, pure evil was first defined in 
this thesis as a purely principled stance to do what is evil primarily because it is evil.  Whereas 
most, if not all, evil-doing is performed with some incentive in mind (e.g. power, pleasure, fame 
and glory, etc.), the incentive or motivation behind purely evil agency is the action itself.  With 
Kant as the final component of this analysis, the previous section suggests that a purely evil 
human being is viable at the very core of one’s motivational structure.  Assuming that the mirror 
thesis is true, the moral law can be either a source of disgust and contempt or inspire respect and 
admiration.  Hence, one can think of purely evil human beings as incorporating a motivational 
reversal of the moral law (i.e. that which is good) whereby evil is chosen precisely because it 
does not correspond with the moral law.    
The objection one can bring to this interpretative solution is that it ultimately fails to 
specifically illustrate what is being defined.  The agent in question is someone who has convinced 
himself motivationally that evil is worth pursuing for its own sake, but is the agent really purely 
evil or just another instance of perverse evil?  Instead of a purely principled stance, the 
motivational reversal of the moral law may be the result of an ulterior motive such as the thrill 
(i.e. pleasure) of evil or some vain emulation of a fictional villain.  For example, St. Augustine of 
Hippo’s account in section 2.2 can be construed as evil-qua-pleasure or evil-qua-glory rather than 
evil-qua-evil.  When Augustine said, “I had no motive for my wickedness except wickedness 
itself. It was foul and I loved it,”
207
 the thrill of doing evil can count against the motive of doing 
evil for its own sake.  Augustine’s description of his childhood thievery seems to endorse pure 
evil, but other motives may be in play.  Evil agents may be subtly motivated by other incentives.   
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Upon further reflection, this objection stems from earlier concerns in sections 1.1 and 1.2 
about whether pure evil is, in reality, merely a sophisticated perverse evil.  The iconic phrase 
“Evil, be thou my Good” from John Milton’s Paradise Lost provokes different views on the 
mindset or motivational disposition of evil.  The view endorsed by Elizabeth Anscombe and 
David McNaughton about Milton’s Satan may be relevant to this objection.  If bitterness, hatred, 
and contempt are basic attitudes of evil agents, then it naturally seems to follow that evil is a vain 
and rebellious redefinition of what is good.  The negative reaction here seems to correspond to 
the objection that evil agents—whatever they may consciously affirm—mask their perversity in 
convincing ways.  As such, the purely evil human being could be an agent that says their ground 
for action is purely principled but unconsciously have impure motives in play.  But is it 
conceptually absurd for an evil-doer to have purely principled motivations in their actions?  Must 
all evil mindset be supplemented by some underlying perverse incentive?  At the very least, this 
thesis provided an alternative view for thinking otherwise. 
 Admittedly, this objection makes a fair point.  The concern is that one simply does not 
know to what extent any agent (evil or not) is motivated to act.  The conscious mind may itself 
mask other motives that are unknown even to the agent himself.  In the case of Augustine, there is 
hardly any doubt that his childhood thieving elicited some kind of pleasure or thrill.  Yet whether 
Augustine primarily stole those pears for the sake of stealing itself or for the thrill/pleasure of 
stealing is surely an open question.  Furthermore, the mere existence of pleasure in evil-doing 
does not necessarily revoke the possibility of purely evil motivation for human beings.  Just as 
moral saints may get pleasure out of principally being good for its own sake via supererogatory 
acts, evil agents may encounter other incentives that accompany the principled ground of their 
actions.  To reiterate again what was said in chapter one, the difficulty of identifying pure evil in 
human terms should not be used as a verdict on its conceptual coherency.  In light of this 
objection, the solution proposed in the previous section may be retained if amended that the 
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motivational inversion of the moral law does not prevent the interference of other incentives or 
circumstances.  Human motivation is volatile and purely evil motivation can be overshadowed at 




Conclusion: “What does it mean to be Evil?” 
This thesis attempted to foster an inquiry that explored the motivational patterns or 
configurations of evil.  These patterns are both subtle and nuanced, for one is dealing with the 
innermost workings of an agent’s thought processes.  Beginning from a conceptual standpoint, it 
was proposed in section 1.1 that evil agency can be divided between those who perform evil acts 
as a means to some other end and those who perform evil acts for their own sake (on presumably 
principled grounds).  This initial distinction led to a discussion about metaethical theories 
concerning motivation in judgment—motivation internalism and externalism.  Further, the 
addition of Kantian ethical theory elevates the tension that permeates these rival theories.  There 
are several insights that one can take away from this thesis; a few will be explored below.   
 First, while the addition of Kant’s account in Religion may be considered sudden and 
arbitrary, his approach and resultant views align closely with the aims of this thesis.  To get to the 
core of the question “What does it mean to be evil?” it is critical to examine the preconditions that 
spur agents towards such acts.  This requires looking at an agent’s motivations and subsequent 
judgments on an a priori scale.  As pointed out earlier in section 1.1, the danger of analyzing evil 
intentions on the level of appearances is the strong possibility of being misled by them.  
Experience only tells part of the story.  It is within the domain of metaethics and other related 
fields (e.g. conceptual analysis, moral psychology, etc.) to reveal the underlying conflicts within 
agent deliberation.   
 This thesis labored to construct a conceptual view of evil that includes the prospect of 
positively choosing to do evil for itself—also called evil-qua-evil motivation.  Sections 2.1 and 
2.2 utilize the metaethical framework of motivation internalism (and externalism) to unravel the 
mechanisms in play when agents carry out evil acts.  But a prevalent feature of many, if not all, 
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internalist views rejects the conceptual coherency of evil-qua-evil motivation.  Socrates’ implicit 
internalism in the Meno and Republic goes so far as to cast doubt on the existence of akrasia in 
moral agency—that a person can know what is morally required of them but be motivationally 
impotent to act accordingly.  While tremendously influential and philosophically intriguing, 
Socratic internalism is largely outdated in relation to current philosophical literature.  Plato’s 
Socrates is unable to benefit from the added depth in human psychology starting with Freud and 
culminating in the ongoing discoveries of neuroscience.  Human beings are much more 
complicated than previously thought. 
Yet purely evil agency is still largely at odds with motivation internalism because of the 
tendency, first outlined in the contemporary views of Elizabeth Anscombe and David 
McNaughton, to conflate an agent’s pursuits as indicative of what the person designates as a 
moral good.  In other words, moral theorizing can take for granted that every agent desires or 
wants to achieve what he/she believes to be normatively good.  It was granted that many 
evildoers do in fact have this sort of mindset whereby the term “evil” is used in an inverted-
commas sense.  These agents were referred to as “closet lovers of the good”.  To put it more 
simply, many evil acts are fueled by a twisted conception of what is good.  Whether it is the 
desire for fame, fortune, or some other greater good, there is a supposed utility or benefit from the 
act that can explain an agent’s motivation.  The overwhelming majority of human evil falls under 
the label of perverse evil as it is defined in section 1.1.  The critical question, though, that has 
dominated the bulk of this thesis is whether evil in some purely principled form is also possible 
for human beings.    
Whenever moral discourse highlights agents like Milton’s Satan that seemingly embrace 
evil for itself, there is an immediate tendency by many to see something incoherent with that 
position.  But the fact that pure evil may be an anomaly that one can only find in literature or 
cinema is largely irrelevant to its conceptual coherency.  
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Kant’s views in Religion offer a balanced approach that can supplement the conceptual 
framework of evil in this thesis.  While Kant rejects the prospect of a thoroughly evil human 
being, his views at least leave open the possibility of beings that can possess such motivations 
(i.e. the devilish or diabolical will).  His three grades of evil seem to give the internalist position 
more elegance and depth to the problems of akrasia and amorality.  Furthermore, the 
interpretation offered in sections 3.2 and 3.3 could resolve the rough edges of Kant’s views on 
diabolical evil and at the same time greatly alleviate the tension within motivation internalism.    
Pure evil was initially defined in section 1.1 as “the performance of evil acts for their 
own sake”.  Over the course of this inquiry, its definition was enhanced through the discussion of 
de re/de dicto language use as well as the distinction between prudential and principled motives 
of morality in connection with Kant’s hypothetical and categorical imperatives.  The addition of 
motivation internalism and externalism put pure evil under scrutiny as to whether one could know 
and with sincerity affirm judgments about goodness without being motivated to act on them.  
Ultimately, with Kant guiding this framework, evil was redefined in a priori terms as when the 
will legislatively prioritizes one principle of maxim selection (self-love) over another (the moral 
law).  As such, an agent’s Gessinung or moral disposition to be good (or evil) is determined by 
whether the moral law is properly situated to determine one’s basis for action.   
Admittedly, the solution offered in section 3.3 does not make evil-qua-evil motivation 
any more likely.  But the conceptual possibility and/or coherency of a principally evil human 
being can be preserved in Kantian terms if one considers the variations of human emotion and the 
effects it can have on moral motivation.  Paul Formosa shares a similar view and also appeals to 
imagination and passion as an outlet for understanding evil-qua-evil.
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  With revulsion as the 
suggested feature of evil-qua-evil motivation, one can conceive a human being perhaps 
surpassing the garden-variety wickedness of evildoers when the moral law is used as an incentive 
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for self-love.  Such an agent is not deceived about prioritizing self-love over the moral law and, 
hence, their will is not frail or impure.  Nor is the agent redefining and justifying self-love as an 
evaluative good in place of the moral law—which falls under Kant’s third grade wickedness and 
what this thesis calls perverse evil.  However, the purely or principally evil human being falls 
short of diabolism, which renounces the moral law entirely, since the moral law as an incentive is 
inverted to affirm what is evil because it is evil.  This solution preserves what Lawrence 
Pasternack calls “Kant’s middle course between diabolism and unintentional immorality” since 




This leads to the most important insight of this thesis: motivation is not a one way street.  
Evil is not simple, especially when considering the conditions and circumstances that involve 
making judgments and acting on them.  While there are general patterns of perversity in human 
evil, motivation are as flexible and quite adaptive to changes in both circumstance and agent 
mood.  One should be aware of the intricacies of motivation and the impact that emotion can have 
on an agent’s moral disposition(s).  The details matter and are critical to fully explaining moral 
agency—good and evil.  Kant’s insistence that the moral law cannot be extirpated, only obscured 
through self-love, should not be ignored or dismissed.  Though Kant’s views on human freedom 
are limited to within the bounds of a structural heterogeneity between pure reason and inclination, 
there are still ways—if this interpretive solution is correct—in which evil motivations can subvert 
the moral law from within the darkest corners of man’s passion.  The potentiality for human 
beings to either heroically uphold duty to the moral law or catastrophically fall into the pit of self-
love is endless, as Formosa rightly points out. 
 “The depths to which humanity can sink are almost bottomless. But no matter 
how far we sink, as long as we retain our agency, and thus the capacity for pure 
reason to practically determine our actions, the hope for progress need not be 
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completely lost.  Humanity has it in it to approach the perfection of angels no less 
than the depravity of devils.”
210
                   
Becoming familiar with the depths of evil at the fundamental level of motivation and judgment 
can better equip theorists in answering these and other issues of moral importance.  In revealing 
humanity’s potential devilishness, one can take the steps towards addressing it.  This thesis has 
scratched the surface of these issues in the hope that future inquiries will yield an enormous 
treasure trove of knowledge and wisdom.   
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